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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on Banking Crises and Deposit Insurance. (August 2008) 
Wen-Yao Wang, B.A., National Taipei University; 
M.A., National Taipei University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Li Gan 
 
 
My research focuses on the reasons for banking crises and the corresponding policy rules 
that could help prevent such crises. This abstract briefly reviews the two essays in my 
dissertation. The first essay focuses on the optimal mechanism design of the deposit 
insurance system while the second essay studies the impact of international illiquidity on 
domestic banking crises. 
The Recent Deposit Insurance Reform in the U.S. raised the coverage limit for 
certain types of deposits. In chapter II, I study the optimal coverage limit in a model of 
deposit insurance in the banking system. Because of the coverage limit, depositors have 
incentives to monitor the bank’s risk-taking behavior, threatening banks with the 
withdrawal of deposits if necessary. The model includes risk-taking banks, 
heterogeneous depositors, and a benevolent insurance company providing deposit 
insurance. I find that partial coverage combined with risk-sensitive premia in the 
presence of capital requirements can improve social welfare and manage banks’ risk-
taking behavior. Moreover, when a partial coverage limit is in place, banks are better off 
by finding a balance between the higher premia and the depositors’ monitoring and 
withdrawals.  
Unlike chapter II, chapter III focuses on the role played by international 
illiquidity. I build a dynamic general equilibrium model (DGEM) of a small, open 
economy. The features I include in the model are nontrivial demands for fiat currencies, 
unanticipated sunspots, and financial/banking crises originated by sudden stops of 
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foreign capital inflows are. This chapter gives us a better understanding of the 
performance of alternative exchange rate regimes and associated monetary policies 
under a simple setup. I show the existence of multiple equilibria that may be ranked 
based on the presence of binding information constraints and on welfare. Moreover, I 
show that a strong connection of the scope for existence and for indeterminacy of 
equilibria with the underlying policy regime. I also find that the presence of binding 
multiple reserve requirements help in reducing the scope for financial fragility and panic 
equilibria.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Obviously, current sub-prime mortgage turmoil in the U.S. has brought the banking and 
financial crises to the forefront of the public. Volumes of the literature have summarized 
elaborately the evolution of the development of the crises. First, crises may occur due to 
the mismanagement and the inappropriate manipulation of the public sectors. The 
ineffective defending of the exchange rate is one of the possibilities when we talk about 
currency crises in Latin American in 1960s and 70s. Crises could happen once the 
government cannot afford to defend the peg of the exchange rate. The fixed exchange 
rate regime will then collapse accompanying with the huge losses of the foreign reserves. 
Another possibility may provoke crises is associated with the imbalanced fiscal deficits 
and improper monetary expansion of the government. One example is the hyperinflation 
situation in Germany in 1920s. The wholesale price index in the year of 1923 is more 
than 700,000,000,000 if we use 1914 as a based year for indexing. Domestic currency is 
worthless because of the rapid growth in money supply and out of control inflation.  
Then, the concerns of the public and the academia move to the sell-fulfilling 
prophecy in a model of a banking crisis. In a traditional Arrow-Debreu setup, bank is a 
redundant sector. Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) paper provided a model of crises that 
emphasizes the role played by financial institutions and domestic banking system. Banks 
provide insurance and liquidity for depositors in the environment with uncertainty. Even 
though the deposit contracts will provide a superior allocation than the one in a pure 
exchange economy, expectation of depositors might generate an unanticipated crisis.  
 
 
 
_____________ 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Journal of Monetary Economics. 
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Depositors are born identically. However, depositors’ withdrawal decisions 
depend on their own types which will be realized later and the expectation of what 
actions other depositors will take. Expectation of the people may vary; either because of 
the shock to the fundamental such as preferences, endowments, and technologies or will 
be affected by any event which may be totally unrelated to the fundamental of the 
economy. The latter is known as the shock of a sunspot1. In chapter III of my 
dissertation, I will amplify the self-fulfilling prophecy; either the unnecessary panic 
among domestic depositors or the panic among foreign creditors might trigger crises. In 
the model, ex-ante identical domestic agents face the uncertainty of their types. The 
realization of depositors’ type is private information. There is a standard problem in 
coordination that may lead to crises of a self-fulfilling type.  
The evolution in the modern literature of crises does not stop here. Unlike the 
studying focuses on the huge government deficits and the self-fulfilling prophecy, the 
overexpansion of the private sector also provokes much discussion in the contemporary 
literature. Financial liberalization and deregulations accelerate international capital flows. 
Domestic banking system is the one which has direct access to deal with the great 
amount of free floating funds. In chapter III of my dissertation I call attention to the 
international illiquidity in a small open economy to reproduce several aspects of the 
East-Asian countries at the time of the crisis. The interaction between domestic banking 
system and foreign creditors is meant to provide a rigorous basis for the foundation to 
analyze the Asian crisis in 1997. In this chapter, I investigate the overexpansion of credit 
and the increasing risky behavior of domestic banking system. More importantly, I study 
the appropriate tight monetary policy in the form of reserve requirements to prevent 
bank run. A dynamic general equilibrium model with fiat currencies is introduced. This 
setup will allow us to extend the research easily to the comparison between different 
monetary policies and various exchange rate regimes. Private sector is a net debtor of the 
rest of the world, and there is an exogenous upper limit to foreign credit at each point in 
time. Depositors are born identically but face uncertainty. Crises come into the model in 
                                                 
1 Please see The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money & Finance (1992, P.601) for more discussion and the 
definition of the sunspot equilibrium. 
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the form of sudden stops of foreign credit and/or the possible unreasonable panics 
among depositors. This research aims at giving a more accurate policy suggestion that 
prevents the crisis from the over-expansion of the banking sector. To set the stage for 
what I try to study, both domestic and foreign fiat currencies circulate in the economy. 
Domestic investment is subject to multiple reserve requirements that take the form of 
currency reserves. I find that the reserve requirements will prevent the panic and run 
equilibrium from happening.  
Besides, the concerns about pervasive banking crises induce and lead many 
countries to provide deposit insurance. “After all, there is an element in the readjustment 
of our financial system more important than currency, more important than gold, and 
that is the confidence of the people themselves”, said by President Franklin in his first 
Fireside Chat. Indeed, adopting deposit insurance at the time of the crises will not only 
protect small depositors, restoring the confidence of the people and preventing the 
unnecessary panic and runs might be the most important task. The U.S., for example, has 
adopted deposit insurance at the time of the Great Depression in 1933. While D-D model 
proved that the deposit insurance may successfully prevent run equilibrium, an 
accompanying moral hazard concerns have never been forgotten since the very first 
stage when the U.S. adopted deposit insurance. The U.S. Savings & Loan (S&L) crisis 
in 1980s, which resulted in approximately 3.2 percent of the GDP in the year of the 
crisis, has pointed to the central problem, the moral hazard of deposit insurance. 
Releasing geographical barriers of the branches increased competition among banks. 
Abolishing the Regulation Q lowered the banks’ charter values even further to the point 
banks engage risky banking practices. Then, under the protection of the deposit 
insurance, banks shift losses, the negative consequence of risk, to the FDIC easily.2 As a 
consequence, bank’s moral hazard problem will put on great risk on deposit insurance 
funds. The relatively low capital-to-asset ratios made the owners of the banks felt less 
inhibited from taking excessive risks with depositors’ funds. All of the reasons listed 
                                                 
2 As the explanation made in Keeley (1990), if the bank is insolvent but with a valuable charter, once the 
bank is assumed and purchased by the FDIC, the owner of the bank cannot trade and sell the franchise 
anymore. Therefore, if the bank has a valuable charter as asset, the owner of the bank will limit and 
manage the risk of failure. 
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above would give banks an incentive to take excessive risks, which is what we called 
moral hazard. Moreover, deposit insurance worse the moral hazard problem by reducing 
the motivation for depositors to monitor and supervise the banks’ gambling behavior.  
Banks’ excessive risk-taking and gambling behavior under the environment with 
imperfect information is what we call moral hazard. If banks’ investment decisions are 
very costly to observe, banks tend to take higher risks than the level the FDIC is 
desirable. Since banks respond to incentives, I discuss whether partially-covered deposit 
insurance can manage banks’ excessive risk-taking behavior in chapter II in my 
dissertation. It is interesting to see whether deposit insurance system will be devastated 
by the moral hazard problem and eventually increase the risk for banks to default. The 
merit of the deposit insurance is to prevent bank run and the chaos in financial market; 
however, it may in turn induce excessive risk-taking and run. Depositors who under the 
safety net of deposit insurance tend to pay less attention about the banks’ excessive risk 
taking. Weakened market discipline also aggravates the moral hazard problem in 
banking system. In this chapter of my dissertation, I attempt to investigate the optimal 
mechanism design of deposit insurance. In particular, I focus on how the policies 
instrument such as risk-sensitive premium and capital requirements can be used to 
manage banks excessive risk-taking problem in an environment in which banks have 
incentives to gamble while motivated depositors monitor. As will be discussed later in 
chapter II, a partially covered deposit insurance system will provide an incentive for 
depositors to monitor and further manage the banks’ moral hazard problem. This is the 
main access to reinforce the market discipline.  
The financial markets are contagious and sensitive to various reasons that might 
trigger crises and bank runs. To give a complete perspective of the evolution of the 
crises, we should not neglect the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis happened in the U.S. 
This turmoil of the sub-prime mortgage crisis rooted in the housing markets could be 
another generation model of the crises. The moral hazard problem of the financial 
institutions mixed with the self-fulfilling prophecy among depositors and creditors give 
us another possibility to think about. My research will be extended toward this direction. 
  
5
Competition among financial institutions and mortgage companies encouraged the risky 
behavior of making loans to sub-prime mortgage borrowers. The subsequent slowdown 
of the housing price boom and the burst of the housing bubble narrowed the chance for 
borrowers to refinance their mortgages. Hence, default rates and the number of home 
foreclosures are skyrocketing. It could be the first symptom toward the crisis. Liquidity 
concerns and increased risk aversion among banks made things worse by driving up the 
interest rates on loans. The widespread credit crunch and the potential banking crises can 
be seen as a consequence of the self-fulfilling panic withdrawals. 
It is hard to clarify and pinpoint the cause of the crisis because crises usually 
blend with the surroundings. However, studying a specific type of crises, such as Asian 
crises or the crises triggering by moral hazard, can help us concentrate on the issue of 
what appropriate policy is to prevent bank runs. The rest of the dissertation is organized 
as follows. In chapter II, I first investigate the partial deposit insurance and the moral 
hazard in banking. When we talk about deposit insurance, one issue has always received 
lots of attention is how to price. In this chapter, how to determine an optimal coverage 
limit plays a central role in the theoretical model. The welfare-maximized coverage 
gives a reason for depositors to monitor. Then, I move from a partial equilibrium model 
in a closed economy to a small open economy with dynamic general equilibrium model. 
Mainly focusing on the international illiquidity in chapter III, I discuss how financial 
fragility might be influenced by different exchange rate regimes and, more importantly, 
the corresponding monetary policies. Tight monetary policy comes in the model in a 
form of reserve requirements. I find that this policy could be an appropriate policy to 
prevent bank run. Finally, I make a brief conclusion of my research and list some 
possible vehicles for future extensions in chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER II 
PARTIAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND MORAL HAZARD IN BANKING 
 
Countries with deposit insurances differ significantly on how much protection their 
deposit insurance would provide. The Deposit Insurance Reform in the U.S. in 2005 
raised the coverage limit for retirement accounts. This paper studies the optimal 
coverage limit in a model of deposit insurance with capital requirements and risk 
sensitive premia. The model includes risk-taking banks, heterogeneous depositors, and a 
benevolent insurance company providing deposit insurance. I find that partial coverage 
combined with risk-sensitive premia in the presence of capital requirements can improve 
social welfare. Because of the partial coverage limit, depositors have incentives to do 
part of the monitoring of the bank’s risk-taking behavior, threatening banks with 
withdrawals of deposits if necessary. Moreover, banks are better off by finding a balance 
between the premia and withdrawals by depositors. 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Countries differ significantly on how much protection their deposit insurance would 
provide. Most developed countries have a smaller coverage limit as a percentage of per 
capita GDP than developing countries (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002). In the U.S., the 
most recent deposit insurance reform, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 2005, has 
increased the coverage limit for retirement accounts to $250,000, and this coverage limit 
would also be indexed to inflation adjustment in the future.  
Raising the coverage limit, on the one hand, increases consumer’s protection; on 
the other hand, however, it may create disincentives for depositors to monitor the banks’ 
risk-taking behavior. Greenspan (2002) provided a great annotation for this moral hazard 
problem: 
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The market discipline to control risks that insured depositors would 
otherwise have imposed on banks and thrifts has been weakened. 
Relieved of that discipline, banks and thrifts naturally feel less inhibited 
from taking on more risk than they would otherwise assume. This 
incentive to take excessive risks is the so-called moral hazard problem of 
deposit insurance, the inducement to take risk at the expense of the 
insurer.3 
 
The empirical evidence supports Greenspan’s statement. Using a panel of 71 
countries, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) show that countries with higher 
coverage limits would have higher probabilities of banking crises.  
Thus, raising the coverage limit, while benefiting consumers, seems to contradict 
the goal of reducing the moral hazard problem. This contradiction has been discussed 
since the beginning of the deposit insurance system. It is indeed the case that wide-
spread deposit insurance can easily achieve the goal of protecting small depositors and 
of preventing them from panicking; however, generous coverage limit encourages the 
excessive risk-taking behavior by financial institutions. Thus, it is necessary to build up 
a model of an optimal coverage limit. My optimal coverage model emphasizes the active 
role by the depositors in helping reduce the bank’s excess risk-taking behavior. Under 
the partially-covered deposit insurance, rich depositors can credibly threaten the bank by 
monitoring and early withdrawals. As a consequence, the owners of the bank tend to 
choose prudently the investment combinations. 
The literature on deposit insurance has not yet offered a model of optimal 
coverage. The existing models on resolving the moral hazard emphasizes the roles of 
capital requirement and risk-sensitive premia, under the assumption of full deposit 
insurance (Hellmann, Murdock, Stiglitz, 2000; Cooper and Ross, 2002).  This 
assumption of full insurance is not consistent with the empirical evidence. My model 
suggests that the coverage limit can be an effective policy tool to manage moral hazard. 
                                                 
3 The Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan, Paragraph 7. 
  
8
Because of the partial coverage limit, the depositors have an incentive to do part of the 
monitoring of the banks’ risk-taking behavior, threatening banks with early withdrawal 
of deposits if necessary. Banks could be better off by finding a balance between the 
higher premia and the depositor’s monitor and withdrawals. In addition, the coverage 
limit derived from the welfare maximization problem in this model provides us with an 
alternative method to the option pricing method in obtaining the appropriate coverage 
limit and risk premium. 
 Coverage limit varies across countries. Demirguc and Kane (2002) show that 
coverage limits among different countries may vary from a generous guarantee to a very 
tight limit. Using the ratio of the coverage limit to GDP per capita as a standard criterion, 
they find that some of the poor countries provide very generous coverage than the high-
income countries. For example, Central African Republic, Chad, and Peru set up the 
coverage limits that are far above the deposits saved by their citizens. On the other hand, 
developed countries or relatively high-income countries tend to provide less protection. 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom have a coverage limit which is 
equal to or even less than the GDP per capita. The U.S. is counted as having an adequate 
coverage with the coverage limit three times greater than the GDP per capita. In addition, 
the authors observe that countries recently established the deposit insurance or revised 
the insurance system set up different coverage limits. Therefore, in this paper I study the 
optimal coverage limit and its effect on moral hazard. 
Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) argue that both the capital requirement 
and the deposit interest rate control are necessary for resolving the moral hazard 
problem. Banks are not willing to hold capital to an unlimited amount since the cost of 
the internal capital is greater than the return from a safe asset. Due to a simple revealed 
preference, the only reason banks finance the investment through capital is because of 
capital requirements. This policy puts shareholders at risk and may successfully suppress 
banks’ gambling behavior. Deposit interest rate controls have not been in effect since the 
regulation Q was removed in 1986 in the U.S. Without further regulations, banks 
compete with each other by offering higher interest rates. In order to compensate 
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missing profits, banks will engage in risky banking practices. Cooper and Ross (2002) 
find that capital requirements coupled with full deposit insurance will support the first-
best allocation without bank runs and monitoring from depositors. Their paper extends 
the traditional Diamond and Dybvig model to discuss moral hazard problem. They find 
that complete deposit insurance alone will not support the first-best outcome and 
monitoring is unnecessary to achieve the best allocation. Under a fully-covered 
insurance system, banks may not have any incentive to maintain costly capital since 
depositors’ unnecessary panics and runs described by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) will 
be prevented. Capital requirements in my study serve as a way to manage the moral 
hazard problem under the partial deposit insurance. Not only banking regulations, 
partially-covered insurance system also reawakens depositors’ monitoring and self-
protection through early withdrawals.  
Empirically, many researchers have studied and elaborately illustrated the role of 
market discipline under deposit insurance. Barajas and Steiner (2000) show the ability of 
the Colombian deposit insurance system to limit moral hazard when considering market 
discipline. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) provide us with cross-country evidence 
that explicit deposit insurance lowers the market discipline on banks’ risk-taking. While 
some of the literature shows that market discipline can be an effective way to restrain the 
bank’s risk-taking behavior, Maechler and McDill (2003), on the other hand, find that 
depositors’ discipline may be present, but the actual effect on reducing a bank’s 
excessive risk-taking cannot be determined. Also, Bliss and Flannery (2000) find that 
market discipline may not be an effective tool, and banking regulations and supervisions 
need to be in place. While some publications have addressed the issue of market 
discipline on banks’ risk-taking behavior, the empirical results of market discipline are 
ambiguous and remain unclear.  
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical foundation for market 
discipline on maximizing social welfare. In this paper, I make an effort to examine how 
partial deposit insurance affects market discipline through depositors’ optimal behavior 
in a circumstance under which a limited depository coverage limit, a risk-sensitive 
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premium and contingent capital requirements are introduced. One thing deserves the 
special emphasis when I compare this paper to the literature. The main reason causes 
crisis or bank run in the model is because of the unobservable gambling behavior in the 
banking system. The bank has a temptation to engage in risky assets and benefits from 
the higher expected return. Once the bank gamble loses, the bank might become 
insolvent and illiquidity. Therefore, there is a bank run in this paper. On the other hand, 
Diamond and Dybvig focus on the runs triggered by the private information among 
depositors. Depositors save to the bank at the beginning of the period and withdraw any 
time they want depending on their random realized types. If there is a shock, whether it 
is related or is totally unrelated with the fundamental of economy, panics among 
depositors might cause huge withdrawals. Deposit insurance can successfully prevent 
panicking among depositors but may worse banks’ excessive risk-taking behavior. Even 
through the reason triggers bank run may be different, under the partial deposit insurance, 
it is easy for us to discuss a panic situation among depositors. In order to do that, the 
sequential serve constraint should be considered. 
Focusing on the moral hazard problem addressed here, the main contribution of 
this paper is to tackle the joint determination of optimal coverage limit and optimal risk 
premium within a partial equilibrium model. In this model, the deposit insurance with 
limited coverage is essential to the effort of managing the moral hazard problem. 
Because of the partial coverage limit, the depositors have an incentive to do part of the 
monitoring of the banks’ risk-taking behavior, threatening banks with early withdrawal 
of deposits if necessary. To introduce market discipline and moral hazard problem, three 
types of agents are introduced in the model. Banks display excessive risk-taking 
behavior. Depositors are ex-ante heterogeneous with different endowments, and a 
benevolent insurance company provides deposit insurance. I find that partial deposit 
insurance combined with risk sensitive premium in the presence of capital requirements 
can improve social welfare.  
  
11
2.2  THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
2.2.1  Depositors 
Ex-ante heterogeneous depositors are introduced in this paper; depositors are born with 
different endowments. Depositors care about the consumption at the end of the day. For 
simplicity, I only consider two types of depositors in the economy. There is continuum 
of depositors with unit mass in the economy. With a fixed fraction q, a depositor was 
born with higher endowments D1, and belongs to the group of rich; otherwise, she/he has 
endowments D2, and belongs to the poor. D1 is greater than D2. The exogenous fraction 
q is public information, which is known by the bank, depositors, and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).4 In reality, small depositors have a relatively large 
portion of total savers, so I assume that q < 1-q. Depositors will decide whether they 
would monitor the banks’ behavior, and whether they will withdraw their deposits early. 
I also assume that depositors only have access to a storage technology. That is if they 
keep their endowments at the beginning of the period, what they will expect at the end of 
the day is the left over endowments they save in their secret vault without any interests 
earning.  Therefore, a rational depositor will save her/his endowments to the bank if 
there is no risk of losing the deposits. 
Even thought introducing different types of depositors in the setting is similar to 
the traditional Diamond-Dybvig (DD) banking model, I need to emphasize that the role 
plays by the depositors is totally different. In DD model, depositor’s type is private 
information; she/he could either be impatient or be patient. The patient depositor’s panic 
and withdrawal causes bank run. On the other hand, depositors in our model could either 
be the rich or be the poor. I do not discuss the private information problem among 
different types of depositors. The informational asymmetries come into the model in the 
                                                 
4 In order to focus on the hidden action of the bank’s gambling behavior, we do not discuss the situation 
when there is private information. However, we can extend our model later when introducing the dynamic 
in the system. Once the type of a depositor is private information and the self-fulfilling prophecy is 
included, depositors’ behavior becomes more unpredictable. Not only does the expected withdrawals from 
the rich depositors relies heavily on what they expect other people to do, the possibility of the free rider 
will also affect which equilibrium the society will achieve.  
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form of the unobserved gambling behavior in the bank. Monitoring and withdrawal from 
the rich depositors would be one of the possible solutions to prevent bank failure 
triggering by moral hazard. 
 
2.2.2  Banks 
There is a continuum of identical banks with unit mass in the economy. For simplicity, I 
consider the behavior of a representative bank. In this model, only the bank has access to 
investment technology. A representative bank forms its investment portfolio by choosing 
any combination between two assets: a prudent asset with certain return α, and a risky 
asset with a random realized return R, which belongs to a normal distribution 
~ ( )2,σRN . R  is greater than α, and α>1.  
While some literatures have considered the moral hazard addressed here, I extend 
the traditional banking model in a number of ways. The most important difference is 
introducing heterogeneous depositors. Different types of depositors might take different 
actions. Especially the rich depositors can give banks a credibly threat by early withdraw. 
Therefore, market participants’ behavior will indirectly guide the bank to take the 
desirable action for which the whole society can be better off. Other than that, this model 
allows a more flexible investment technology; the bank can choose any gamble-prudent 
combinations to invest. The bank’s moral hazard problem arises in this environment 
because of the hidden actions of its risk-taking behavior. Only the bank itself will know 
the amount invested in the risky assets. Since it is impossible or very costly for either 
depositors or the deposit insurer to observe the information, banks’ excessive risk-taking 
behavior is the key in this model triggering bank run. In the literature, Hellmann, 
Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) limited the portfolio in which the bank can choose in 
between either safety assets or the risky assets when discussing the moral hazard 
problem in banking. Even through Cooper and Ross(2002) modified the Diamond-
Dybvig banking model by offering another riskier investment technology, the bank still 
faces the restricted choices of its investment portfolio.  
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2.2.3  The FDIC 
The FDIC serves as the benevolent social planner, who cares about both the welfare of 
depositors and banks. If we assume that banks are in a perfectly competitive market, 
competition among banks leads to zero profit. We can expect a symmetric equilibrium in 
which all banks pay the same interest rate, r, for deposits, where r>1. If that is the case, 
the welfare maximization problem for the FDIC simply becomes the one that maximizes 
only depositor’s expected returns. Intuitively, the higher the deposit rates a bank is 
willing to offer, the more funds the bank might attract to finance its investment. Also, 
the higher the deposit rate a bank needs to pay, the more likely it is to engage in a risky 
investment portfolio5. I deviate from the perfect competition assumption among banks. 
The representative bank generates some normal profits from transferring the funds6. 
Therefore, the FDIC’s problem maximizes the expected return of both depositors and the 
bank. 
Under an explicit deposit insurance system, either one with full insurance or the 
one with a binding maximum coverage limit, the deposit insurer finances its projects and 
commits to its obligations by charging risk premia, P, among banks.  
 
2.3  THE MODEL 
 
I first consider the situation where there are no banks, the autarkic equilibrium. Since I 
assume that depositors have no access to the investment technology, the resources 
depositors are born with at the beginning of the period, qD1+(1-q)D2, is the amount they 
can consume at the end of the day with depreciation rate β, where 0<β<1. Under full 
information, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide the reason for banks to exist in our 
economy: the bank’s deposit contract provides allocations superior to those of the pure 
exchange market. The bank not only provides liquidity, it also offers the insurance, 
which generates the return for depositors in each state of the world as closer as possible. 
                                                 
5 In a general equilibrium setting, interest rate is going to clear the market. However, in our model, we 
temporarily consider the partial equilibrium setting for simplicity, and will extend our model to the general 
equilibrium later. 
6 See Boyd, Chang, and Smith (2002) for some discussions of the bank’s normal profits.   
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In our model, the insurance is offered by the FDIC instead of the bank. The deposit 
contract becomes more complicated when private information and hidden actions occur 
in the model. If the bank’s investment choices are hidden actions and cannot be observed 
by depositors and the deposit insurer, the bank’s risk sharing facility might come with 
some cost, the moral hazard problem. In this section, I discuss three possible scenarios in 
the economy: without the deposit insurer in section 3.1, with the fully covered deposit 
insurance in section 3.2, and with the partial coverage insurance plan in section 3.3. 
Analyzing the coverage-determination process is important because the interaction 
among market participants relies heavily on the optimal coverage limit when we 
consider the moral hazard in banking. Therefore, I put more efforts to emphasize the 
benefits of the partial deposit insurance scheme, and investigate its effect to reduce the 
bank’s moral hazard problem. 
 
2.3.1  Without the FDIC 
If there is no deposit insurer, the economy simply goes back to the situation in which the 
bank provides deposit contracts that transform the illiquid assets into liquid liabilities. 
The heterogeneous depositors decide how much they want to deposit, and whether they 
will monitor the bank’s behavior. I assume that both the rich and the poor depositor face 
a fixed monitoring cost, d, which does not vary across different endowments. Since there 
is no deposit insurance in place, even the poor depositor, who was born with lower 
endowments D2, will engage in monitoring. If depositors engage in monitoring, they 
observe the true failing probability of the bank, PF. On the other hand, if depositors are 
not willing to spend monitoring costs, d, they can only gather the information of the 
bank’s failing probability, *FP , from the past information. Market discipline might come 
from the unprotected depositors in the economy. Without the FDIC, depositor’s self-
protection is necessary, and might arise either by asking for a higher deposit interest rate 
or by withdrawing early from the bank. No matter which action the depositors are going 
to take, monitoring is the first step towards an effective market discipline. With 
monitoring, depositors can observe the bank’s failing probability in advance. The 
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opportunity cost of the depositor’s monitoring is the potential interest she/he might earn 
from saving. I find an endogenous threshold for either the rich or the poor depositor to 
monitor. If  
( )
*
*
)1(
1
FF
FF
j PrPr
rdPdPDD ⋅+⋅−
⋅−+⋅=> , where j = 1, 2, 
depositors are willing to monitor the bank’ s gambling behavior7. Given the bank’s true 
failing probability, PF , the estimated past failing probability, *FP , and depositor’s 
monitoring cost, d, if the initial endowments the depositor was born with exceeds D*, 
monitoring will be the best choice for the depositor to take.  
 
2.3.2  The Fully-Covered Deposit Insurance System  
The benefits of the deposit insurance, as significant as they are, have not come without 
cost. Some people are concerned that instead of protecting the small depositors, which 
have a relatively large portion of total savers, fully covered deposit insurance may 
increase the likelihood of a bank’s failure. Could the fully covered deposit insurance 
policy be a source that triggers the bank’s excessive risk-taking behavior, and further 
increase the bank’s failure rate? 
At the beginning of each period, depositors save inelastically in the bank, and the 
bank chooses the combination of the optimal gamble and prudent assets. Obviously, 
depositors have no incentives to monitor and withdraw early under the fully covered 
deposit insurance system.8 Every depositor gets the guaranteed principal plus interests 
no matter what happens to the bank. Even if the bank is insolvent and assumed by the 
FDIC, a depositor has nothing to lose under the safety net offered by the FDIC. How to 
finance the FDIC’s deposit insurance plan is simply by charging the risk-sensitive 
premium from the financial institutions depending on the risk they take.  
 
                                                 
7 This can be seen as a special case when we discuss depositors’ monitoring in section 3.3. Under the 
circumstance that no deposit insurance in place, we find a threshold for depositor to monitor by 
considering the optimal coverage limit is equal to zero. 
8 Under the full covered deposit insurance system, depositors would monitor banks’ behavior if they know 
the full insurance is not always feasible. In our paper, we rule out this possibility. 
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2.3.2.1  The Risk-Sensitive Premium and the Capital Requirements 
When it comes to the solution for reducing bank’s excessive risk-taking problem, two 
main streams have been discussed extensively in the literature: some of the literature 
focuses on the banking regulations such as capital requirements, co-insurance, and 
compulsory insurance while others look for the solution back to the market mechanism. 
In this section, I will discuss the effect of some contemporary banking regulations. When 
the bank’s actions are not observable, the FDIC must design a compensation scheme for 
banks in a way that indirectly gives the bank incentives to take the correct actions. To 
solve the moral hazard problem, the FDIC offers the compensated contract to the bank 
with the risk-sensitive premium, P, and the corresponding capital requirements.  
k is the percentage of the deposits held as capital requirements; kD is the 
shareholders’ equity that can be used in a bank’s investment activity. Capital is costly; it 
comes with a higher cost, ρ, than the return from prudent assets, α9. Therefore, a rational 
bank will not be willing to hold more capital if the benefit of holding capital is less than 
the cost. At the beginning of the period, the FDIC charges the premium from all the 
banks and announces the regulation of capital requirements to the bank. Capital 
requirements serve as an indicator that shows how much the internal funds are used to 
finance the bank’s investment portfolio. The higher the capital requirements, the more 
the potential losses the shareholders will suffer from the bank’s failure. 
The bank decides how much it will invest in gambling assets. Unlike the safe 
asset, the return of the gamble asset is a random variable, which is not realized by the 
time the bank forms its investment portfolio. Both bank’s investment in the gamble 
assets and the realization of its return tell us whether the bank will survive, or if it might 
fail. The bank’s survival probability with capital requirements and the risk-sensitive 
premium is: 
Pr(Ri +α[(1+K-P)(D1+D2)-i]-(ρK+r)(D1+D2)>0) = Pr(R>R1),  
                                                 
9 The same assumption is made in Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2002) when discussing the policy of 
capital requirements. 
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where R1 ≡ α-(1/i)[α(1+K-P)-(ρK+r)](D1+D2). If the realized return R is greater than the 
survival threshold R1, the bank survives; otherwise, the bank fails. The bank’s expected 
return is  
dRRfDDrKiDDPKRi
R
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Comparing this outcome with the experiment without capital requirements10, the 
gambling asset chosen by the bank will be smaller if both risk-sensitive premium and 
capital requirements are in place. Figure 2.1 shows the bank survival thresholds with and 
without capital requirements, where R1 expresses the threshold with capital requirements 
while Rf shows the survival threshold without policy instruments. Under a full coverage 
insurance system, the bank’s failing probability, PF, also expresses the fraction of the 
banks that may fail in the economy. Therefore, I derive the premium, {PF·r[qD1+(1-
q)D2]-γ}/[qD1+(1-q)D2], from the FDIC’s budget constraint, where γ is the left over 
franchise value if the bank is insolvent and assumed by the FDIC.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1  The Survival Threshold of the Risk-Taking Bank 
 
 
 
The bank’s optimal choice of gambling asset under risk-sensitive premium is  
i1 = ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )α
ρα
−
−++−−+
1
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10 Appendix A shows the bank’s behavior without capital requirements. 
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where ρ > α and if is the gamble asset chosen by the bank without policy instruments 
under the full coverage insurance system. 
Under the fully covered deposit insurance, the capital requirement policy reduces 
the bank’s incentives to gamble by narrowing the bank’s survival probability. The reason 
is simple, the federal and state laws set different priorities for payment of receivership 
claims11. The internal funds from the shareholders have the last priorities among all 
other claims from depositors and general creditors. The capital requirement policy 
reduces a bank’s gamble incentives by putting shareholders at risk. The fear of loss will 
lead to a relatively prudential investment portfolio. This threat occurs when the bank 
chooses how much to gamble at the beginning of the period. It reduces the bank’s failing 
probability, and simultaneously insures depositors.  
 
2.3.3  The Partial Deposit Insurance System 
People are rational and respond to incentives. In this section, instead of focusing on the 
banking regulation, I emphasize the role played by market discipline, referring to market 
power from depositors participating in the economy. Not only focusing on the deposit 
contract between offering by banks to depositors, in this section I discuss how the action 
of the FDIC will affect both banks and depositors. Deposit insurance works as part of the 
deposit contract when banking failure occurs. Given the optimal compensation from the 
FDIC, depositors may not take the action such as withdrawing early or asking for a 
higher interest rate to reduce banks excessive gambling behavior. Once the partial 
deposit insurance scheme rather than the fully-covered one is announced at the 
beginning of the period, both depositors and banks will adjust in response. 
 
2.3.3.1  Depositors’ Monitoring 
Timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of each period, the FDIC announces 
the maximum coverage limit and capital requirements to the public. Both banks and 
                                                 
11 Summarized by the FDIC, under the national depositor preference law, a failed institution’s assets are to 
be distributed in the order as follows. The administrative expenses of the receiver, the claims of all 
depositors, general creditor claims, subordinated creditor claims, and the last the claims of shareholders. 
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depositors observe this information immediately. Since depositors are heterogeneous, the 
higher the endowments, the more likely the depositors are not fully protected by the 
partial-covered system. At this point in time, depositors make their decisions of how 
much they want to deposit to the bank and whether they want to monitor or not. The 
willingness to monitor is highly related to the coverage limit set up by the FDIC. The 
higher the coverage, the more protection the depositors will get when the bank fails. 
Thus, it is less likely for depositors to monitor and withdraw due to the monitoring cost 
and the opportunity cost of withdrawal. This model builds on the theoretical analysis of a 
one-shot game, depositors take all possible actions of a bank into consideration, and then 
chooses her/his best strategy. 
To distinguish the responses among different groups of depositors, I assume that 
2211 DrDCDrD >>>> . Under the maximum coverage limit, C , the rich depositor 
will decide whether she/he wants to monitor while the poor depositor will save 
inelastically to the bank. The rich depositor whose endowment exceeds the coverage 
limit does not have full deposit protection; therefore, the rich depositor is willing to 
engage in monitoring. On the other hand, even if the bank fails, a poor depositor is the 
one who has access to the fully guaranteed amount, and will pay less attention to bank’s 
gamble. 
Our objective in this paper is to encourage risk-oriented monitoring from 
depositors, which is market discipline. The purpose of depositors’ monitoring is to get 
an access to know the bank’s gambling behavior and purchase the right to withdraw 
early. Without monitoring, a bank’s investment decision is hidden action; only the bank 
itself knows how much it invests in gambling assets and its level of risk. However, with 
monitoring, the depositor who spends the monitoring cost, d, will observe the bank’s 
true failing probability. Furthermore, early withdrawal can be seen as one of the 
consequences of monitoring. In the worst situation, if the bank fails and is liquidated by 
the FDIC, the depositors who choose to monitor can withdraw early by the amount 
which exceeds the maximum coverage limit. Early withdrawal somewhat provides 
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depositors another safety net outside the deposit insurance. This self protection is not 
free; the cost of early withdrawal is the interest losses. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2  Depositors’ Two-Step Decision 
 
 
 
The discrete monitoring decision for the rich depositor in Figure 2.2 can be 
solved backward. Depositor’s decision can be separated into two stages. In the first 
stage, whether the depositor is willing to monitor relies on depositor’s expected 
earnings. Once the depositor decides to monitor, she/he spends a fixed monitoring cost, 
d, and will know the bank’s failing probability, PF. Then, depositor’s decision moves to 
the next stage, whether she/he wants to withdraw earlier. With probability PF, a 
depositor will withdraw early even if she/he loses the potential interest from savings. A 
depositor’s expected return from monitoring is  
PF (D1-d)+(1-PF)r(D1-d). 
If a depositor decides not to monitor the bank’s behavior, she/he will observe a biased 
estimate of a bank’s failing probability, *FP , from previous experience and information. 
Due to this decision, this depositor has no backup plan such as withdraw early can be 
chosen in the second stage. If the bank fails, the depositor receives, C , the maximum 
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amount guaranteed by the FDIC. She/he loses any deposits exceeding C . The expected 
return for a depositor without monitoring is  
1
** )1( rDPCP FF −+ . 
If a depositor’s expected return from monitoring is greater than the one without 
monitoring, she/ he will monitor the bank’s risk-taking behavior. If the initial 
endowment of the rich depositor is greater than D*, where 
D* ≣ 
*
*
)1(
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She/he will monitor the bank to ensure her/his deposits; otherwise, she /he saves all 
without monitoring. Comparing to the threshold I derived early in section 3.1, the 
threshold for depositor to monitor is higher under the partially covered deposit insurance 
than the case when there is no insurance at all. The result is unsurprising. Without the 
protection offered by the FDIC, more depositors are willing to monitor the bank to make 
sure their own safety. Expected deposits of the heterogeneous depositors are 
 
 E(D)=q[Pr(D1>D*)(D1-d)+Pr(D1<D*)D1]+(1-q)D2 (2.1) 
Since I assume that 2211 DrDCDrD >>>> , the first term in parentheses is the 
expected saving from the rich depositor, and the second term is the possible deposits 
from the poor. The expected withdrawal from the rich depositor is 
 
 E(W) = q Pr(D1>D*)PF(D1-d-C ) (2.2) 
The depositor who spends the monitoring cost, d, will observe the bank’s true failing 
probability, PF. From equation (2.2), withdrawing the deposits in excess of the coverage 
limit, D1-d-C , is the consequence of monitoring if this depositor observes something 
may go wrong in the bank. The higher the failing probability of the bank, the more likely 
the rich depositors will monitor the bank’s investment decision.  
0
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2.3.3.2  Banks’ Gambling Behavior 
As I assumed in the beginning of this paper, the bank forms its investment portfolio by 
choosing a combination of a safe asset with certain return α and a risky asset with 
random realized return R, where R belongs to N( R ,σ2). With the monitoring from 
depositors, a bank’s response is different from the situation without the market 
discipline. At the beginning of the period, the FDIC announces the maximum coverage 
limit. If there is a binding coverage limit, banks will expect monitoring from certain 
group of depositors with fraction q.  Therefore, when the bank makes its decision, it will 
take all possible actions from both depositors and the FDIC into consideration, and then 
choose how many risky assets it will gamble to maximize the expected return. The 
depositor’s monitoring influences both the bank’s survival probability and the available 
resources the bank can use to finance its investment portfolio. A bank’s survival 
probability is 
  Pr(Ri+α{(1+K-P)[E(D)-E(W)]-i}-(ρK+r)[E(D)-E(W)]>0) = Pr(R>R2),  
where R2 ≡ α-(1/i)[α(1+K-P)-(ρK+r)]{E(D)-E(W)}. If the random return from the 
gambling asset is less than the threshold value, R2, the bank fails; otherwise, the bank’s 
expected return is 
 ER = [ ] [ ]{ } dRRfWEDErKiWEDEPKiR
R
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The bank will maximize its expected return by choosing the optimal gambling assets, i2, 
and the corresponding failing probability, PF. The optimal gambling asset is 
i2 = α
ρα
−
−+−−+
2
))()()](()1([
R
WEDErKPK
, 
which is smaller than if, under the fully-covered deposit insurance. 
 
2.3.3.3. The FDIC’s Optimization Problem 
The benevolent deposit insurer, FDIC, maximizes social welfare. The policy instruments 
the FDCI uses are the risk-sensitive premium, P, and the coverage limit, C . At the 
beginning of each period, the risk-sensitive premium is charged and the maximum 
  
23
coverage limit is announced.12 Once the binding coverage limit is imposed, market 
discipline can be reinforced. Especially the action of the rich depositor will affect banks’ 
gambling and risk-taking behavior. More than that, risk premium also will reduce the 
incentive for banks to gamble. The more risky assets the bank invests, this bank will 
generate a greater risk to lose the deposit insurance funds. Hence, the FDIC will charge a 
higher fee for insurance. The optimal risk premium is determined by the FDIC’s budget 
constraint. When the bank is insolvent and fails, the FDIC reimburses the depositors to 
the point of the maximum coverage limit. For the use of funds for the FDIC, how much 
insurance funds need to be repaid depends on the depositor’s monitoring and withdrawal 
decision. On the other side of the budget constraint, whether the bank is going to fail can 
be evaluated by how much risk the bank assumes. The risk-sensitive premium is 
determined by both the bank’s and the depositor’s decisions. Combining with capital 
requirements, the FDIC can restrain a bank’s excessive risk-taking by counting on the 
action of the internal shareholders and the depositors who are not fully insured.  
When the bank’s actions are not observable, the FDIC must design a 
compensation scheme in a way that indirectly gives the bank the incentive to take the 
socially desirable actions. To solve the moral hazard problem, the FDIC offers the 
compensated contract with reasonable premium to a bank, and the adjusted premium 
relies heavily on a bank’s risk. The FDIC’s optimization problem is to maximize social 
welfare by choosing the optimal premium and coverage limit under its budget constraint. 
The FDIC’s expected return is 
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The social welfare in equation (2.4) includes two major parts: the first element is the 
                                                 
12 If the bank’s type is private information which cannot be observed by the public, a simple revealed 
argument can be made in capital requirements. The lower the reported capital, the higher the risks a bank 
is going to take. Thus, the higher premium will be charged by the FDIC. Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor 
(1992) provide a way to guide the bank to take the correct actions. The combination of the premium and 
capital requirements chosen by the bank can simply reveal the type of the bank. 
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bank’s expected return from the combination of prudent-gamble investment portfolio, 
and the second element is depositor’s expected return generated from both rich and poor 
depositors. The corresponding budget constraint is shown in the following equation 
(2.5).  
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The source of funds can be used to reimburse depositors is represented on the left hand 
side of the budget constraint. The FDIC’s source of funds is the premium and the 
residual of the bank’s liquidating franchise value, γ. The use of funds depends heavily on 
depositor actions, which are shown on the right hand side in equation (2.5). PF is the 
bank’s true failing probability, which can also be seen as the portion of the banks that are 
insolvent and assumed by the FDIC. While the poor depositor is fully insured, the safety 
net offered by the FDIC only partially covers the saving for the rich depositors. 
 
2.4  SOLVING THE MODEL 
 
In this section, I solve the multiparty problem using a numerical example. The behavior 
of the heterogeneous depositors in equation (2.1) and (2.2), the risk-taking bank in 
equation (2.3), and the benevolent FDIC in equations (2.4) and (2.5) can be solved 
simultaneously. In doing so, how important the market discipline is in the model can be 
shown. In order to solve the model numerically, I first set the values of the parameters in 
Table 2.1 as a benchmark, and then I describe the equilibrium results in section 2.4.2. 
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Table 2.1  Definition of the Variables and the Initial Values of the Parameters 
 
Endogenous variable  
DEPOSITOR Expected deposit (E(D)) 
 Expected withdrawal (E(W)) 
BANK Gambling asset (i) 
 Failing probability (PF) 
The FDIC Coverage limit (C ) 
 Risk premium (P) 
Exogenous variable  
DEPOSITOR Endowment of rich (D1): 125000 
 Endowment of poor (D2): 30000 
 Rich percentage (q): 0.1 
 Monitor cost (d): 100 
 Past failing probability ( *FP ): 0.05 
BANK Return of gambling asset~ N(μ= R =1.2, σ2=(0.15)2) 
 Return of safe asset (α): 1.1 
 Cost of internal capital (ρ): 1.12 
 Gross interest rate for deposit (r): 1.04 
 Capital requirement (K): 0.04 
 
 
 
2.4.1  Parameters for the Numerical Example 
Generally, the current scope and level of coverage limit of an individual account is up to 
$100,000, which covers principal plus interests. In order to investigate the effect of 
market discipline, I assume that the endowments of the rich depositor are far above the 
maximum coverage limit while the total endowments of the poor are insured completely 
by the FDIC, where D1 is $125,000 and D2 is $30,000. Since I believe that small 
depositors are a relatively large portion of total savers, I assume that the percentage of 
the depositors who are not fully protected by the deposit insurer is 10%. The monitoring 
cost, d, equals to $100. 
In this model, capital is costly to the bank. As we can see in Table 2.1, the cost of 
the capital, ρ equals to 1.12, is greater than the rate of returns of a safe asset, where α 
equals to 1.1 . If there is no capital requirement policy in the economy, a rational bank 
will not hold any capital. Beginning in 2007, the rate of risk-sensitive premium charged 
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by the FDIC to each institution is base on the capital ratio and the supervisory group 
assignment. For a well capitalized bank, the total risk-based capital ratio should be equal 
to or greater than 10%, and Tier1 risk-based capital ratio is equal to or greater than 6%, 
and the Tier 1 leverage capital ratio is equal to or greater than 5%. For an adequately 
capitalized bank, the capital ratio is located around 4% to 8%. In our model, the total 
risk-based capital ratio equals to kD/i, therefore I assume the percentage of the capital 
requirements is approximately 0.04 to 0.06.  
Other benchmark parameters include return of the gamble assets, where R = 1.2 
and σ = 0.15; interest rate for deposits, r = 1.04; past failing probability, *FP  = 0.05. 
 
2.4.2  Equilibrium Results 
The bank maximizes its expected returns by choosing optimal gambling asset and the 
failing probability while the depositor maximizes her/his expected returns by choosing 
optimal saving and withdrawal simultaneously. Given the risk premium and the 
coverage limit, the optimal gamble assets and expected withdrawals are determined by 
the best response functions derived from different participants in the market. Given the 
bank’s investment portfolio, Figure 2.3. shows the depositor’s expected returns in panel 
(a) and expresses the choice of withdrawals in panel (b). Those figures show a 
depositor’s best response function given the bank’s risk-taking behavior. Depositors’ 
expected returns decline as the bank invests more in risky assets. Therefore, the best 
action for a rational depositor is to withdraw early in response. The more excessive risk-
taking behavior the bank engages, the more likely the depositors are going to withdraw 
their funds. On the other hand, greater withdrawals from the depositors mean less 
available resources the bank will invest either in prudent assets or in risky assets. 
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Figure 2.3  Depositors’ Best Response Function 
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  (a)  Banks’ Expected Returns      (b)  Banks’ Gambling Choice 
 
Figure 2.4.  The Banks’ Best Response Function 
 
 
 
On the other hand Figure 2.4. shows the bank’s expected returns in panel (a) and 
the gambling assets decrease as the depositor’s expected withdrawals increase in panel 
(b). Given depositors’ withdrawals, the bank’s best response function can be shown in 
Figure 2.4. 
The intersection of the depositors and the bank’s best response functions 
determine the optimal choices of different market participants. This is shown in Figure 
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2.5. When varying the coverage limit, the optimal expected withdrawals from depositors 
decline gradually as the coverage limit rises. Eventually, if the deposit insurer provides a 
100% guaranteed insurance to the public, when the coverage limit exceeds D1, 
depositors will not have any motivation to monitor and further withdraw. The market 
discipline can not work. This provides an explanation of why an improperly designed 
insurance plan will increase the risk of bank failure. The important job for the FDIC is to 
choose a proper premium and coverage that maximize social welfare. 
There are two components of social welfare: the expected return for depositors 
and the expected return for the bank. Equilibria in the numerical example are determined 
in three steps. First, given the bank’s investment portfolio, the depositor faces the 
decision whether she/he wants to monitor or not. If the answer is yes, the depositor has 
access to early withdrawals and, at the same time, she/he has to bear a monitoring cost. 
Second, given the information of depositors’ monitoring and withdrawals, the bank will 
choose the combination of the risk-free and risky assets that maximize its expected 
returns.  
Finally, given all the possible actions that could be taken by the market 
participants, the FDIC chooses the coverage limit and premium which maximizes social 
welfare. The bank’s gamble decision and the depositor’s choice of monitor and 
withdrawals can be derived simultaneously given the welfare-maximizing coverage 
limit. The equilibrium results are summarized in Table 2.2, and it enables us to compare 
each episode given the parameters in Table 2.1. In Table 2.2, the first column describes 
the endogenous variables in the multiparty-designed model. The second column shows 
the case where there is no bank; the third column displays the case without any deposit 
insurer; the fourth column discusses the case under fully covered insurance. The last 
column is the case I want to emphasize, the partial deposit insurance system. 
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Table 2.2  Welfare Comparison among the Sub-Cases 
 
Case I. Bank Without the FDIC 
II. Bank With Full 
Coverage 
III. Partial Deposit 
Insurance 
THE FDIC 
Social Welfare 44102 43773 43973 
Coverage Limit . . 90000 
Risk Premium . 0.0094 0.0019 
BANK 
Expected Return 3130.2 2693.1 2936.4 
Gamble Asset 7592.1 7580 6797.6 
Failing Probability 0.003 0.009 0.0020 
DEPOSITOR 
Expected Return 40971 41080 41036 
Expected Deposit 39400 39500 39490 
Expected 
Withdrawal 118.2 . 6.98 
 
 
 
Case I: Bank without the FDIC and any effective banking regulation. If there is 
no deposit insurer, market discipline performed by depositors will be shown. There is no 
doubt that rich depositors will monitor the bank’s risk-taking behavior. Poor depositors 
who were born with relatively less endowments D2, will monitor if the potential losses 
from a banking failure are greater than the cost of monitoring. In Table 2.2, the 
heterogeneous depositors who belong either to the rich or to the poor have incentives to 
monitor the bank’s gambling behavior. Further, depositors may withdraw part of their 
saving early as a strategy of self protection when there is no insurance provided by the 
FDIC. 
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 (d)  Coverage Limit = 110000  (e)  Coverage Limit = 120000 
 
Figure 2.5  The Best Response Function of Both Depositors and Banks when Varying Coverage Limit13
                                                 
13 The vertical axis is the gamble assets chosen by the bank. The horizontal axis is the expected withdrawal chosen by the depositors. The upward-
sloping red line represents the best response function for depositor, and shows the diminishing expected withdrawal in Figure 2.5. Once the depositor is 
under fully protection, when coverage exceeds 125000, she/he has no incentives to monitor or withdraw early. On the other hand, the downward-sloping 
blue-dotted line describes the bank’s best response function given depositor’s behavior. The more the expected withdrawal, the less the bank is going to 
invest in gambling assets. As we can see in Figure 2.5, the bank’s response function bows inward gradually when the coverage limit rises from 50,000 to 
120,000. Under partial covered deposit insurance system, depositor’s monitoring is expected when the bank makes its investment decision. In addition, 
the bank expects that the less effort depositor is going to make in monitoring when the coverage becomes more extensive and generous. 
30
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Case II: Bank with a fully-covered deposit insurance system. Under the full 
protection provided by the FDIC, there is no strong incentive for depositors to monitor 
or even withdraw. Depositors’ decision depends upon the contingent plans they make at 
the beginning of the period. However, in each state of the world, either the bank wins the 
gamble or loses the gamble, there is no difference of the saving decision for any type of 
depositors. In the worst scenario, bank run, both the rich and the poor depositors will 
receive the full guaranteed amount from the deposit insurer. In the third column in Table 
2.2, the heterogeneous depositor chooses to save inelastically and makes no early 
withdrawals. Comparing to the scenario without the FDIC, depositors under a fully 
covered insurance system are better off because of the complete safety net. Some 
literature has discussed that adopting improper deposit insurance will increase the bank 
failures. Under the fully covered deposit insurance, the strategy of depositors’ early 
withdrawals might not credibly threaten the bank’s excessive gambling behavior. As a 
consequence, the bank’s failing probability will increase because of the relatively large 
risky assets chosen by the bank. One goal the government always wants to achieve is 
financial stability. Since crises are costly, without market discipline from the rich, one 
possible solution to reduce the bank’s gambling behavior and failing probability is 
through banking regulations. Risk-sensitive premium serves as a good policy instrument 
that forces the bank to take the social desirable action. The more the bank engages in 
gambling, the higher the premium the FDIC will charge depending on the risk 
assessment system.  
Case III: Partial deposit insurance with capital requirements and risk-sensitive 
premia. In this case, I consider the effect from both the FDIC and the depositors’ 
discipline to manage bank’s moral hazard problem. The last column in Table 2.2 shows 
the equilibrium with depositors’ monitoring and early withdrawals. When the 
government sets up an unlimited coverage for insurance, there is no monitor in the 
economy, and early withdrawal is impossible to be a choice for depositors. However, 
under the partial coverage system, the depositors whose endowments exceed the 
maximum coverage limit might take different actions. Whether rich depositors monitor 
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or not relies on the expected returns from monitoring and withdrawals. More importantly, 
rich depositors’ action has a close relationship with the optimal coverage limit. From 
Table 2.2, the optimal coverage in this numerical example is $90,000. When the 
maximum coverage limit reaches certain high level, most of the savings from depositors 
are insured, the potential losses from the rich depositors will shrink to a very low level. 
Once the cost of the monitoring is above than the possible losses the depositors may 
bear, depositors will not monitor.  
The benefit of the fully covered deposit insurance is the safety net provided by 
the FDIC to the small depositors. However, in order to finance this one-hundred-percent 
guarantee, the FDIC needs to charge an overall higher level of risk premia as we can 
observe in Table 2.2. I also consider the effectiveness to reduce the bank’s risk-taking 
behavior among different insurance system. The decrease of the investment in gamble 
assets is significant when we move from the full coverage system to the partial coverage 
insurance. As a result, bank’s failing probability is lower due to relatively prudential 
investment. I also observe social welfare improvement in the mechanism design of the 
partial deposit insurance system. When the partial coverage system is in place, the bank 
is better off by finding a balance exchanging the higher premium to depositor’s monitor 
and withdrawals. Withdrawal early is the best choice for depositors under partial 
coverage system. Compared with the fully covered insurance plan in case II, the 
premium the bank needs to pay in the case III shrinks under the partial deposit insurance 
system; however, at the same time, the bank has to deal with the potential market 
discipline from the depositor’s monitoring and early withdrawal.  
For depositors, the fully covered insurance generates the maximum expected 
returns among all cases I investigate. Under a complete protection by the insurance plan, 
the depositors will not lose a penny since all deposits and interests are guaranteed by the 
FDIC. Therefore, the interest losses from monitoring and early withdrawal can be 
avoided. However, the inevitable drawback from the full coverage system is that it 
encourages the bank’s risk-taking behavior. In order to make a credible threatening to 
the bank and protect their own deposits, depositors need to scarify some chances to earn 
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the full interest from saving inelastically to the bank. Partially covered deposit insurance 
gives the rich depositors strong motivations to monitor and withdraw if necessary. Also, 
comparing partially covered system to Case I, depositors are better off under the partial 
deposit insurance with market discipline than under the case in which every depositor 
monitors even for those individuals with relatively low endowments. If there is no 
deposit insurance in place, the cost of monitoring is much greater than under the partially 
covered system. One thing deserves a special emphasis is we can not really compare the 
situation without deposit insurance with the case under partially covered system. Since 
depositors are rick neutral instead of risk averse, without banking regulations and the 
deposit insurer, both depositors and bank are willing to engage in risky banking practice 
and gamble for higher returns. Also, the way I introduce heterogeneous depositors 
already rules out the possibility of the panic run equilibrium. Therefore, without the 
possibility of a negative consequence such as a bank run, social welfare I derived in case 
III cannot be compared fairly with the situation with partially-covered system.  
It is worth pointing out that our model provides us an alternative way to derive 
the optimal risk premium. Depending on the Risk-Based Assessment System from the 
FDIC, a financial institution will be charged with the risk-sensitive premium from 5 to 
43 cents per hundred dollars. In our model, the optimal risk premium under the full 
coverage system is 94 cents per hundred dollars. However, the risk-sensitive premium 
decreases if we consider the partial deposit insurance system. The potential premium 
locates in the range around 19 cents per hundred dollars depending on the risks the bank 
will take. The more the bank invests in the gamble assets, the greater the risk premium 
the bank pays. This result emphasizes the important insight that a successful partial 
coverage policy requires a corresponding policy for the risk premium. To be effective, 
the market discipline accompanying the risk premium policy can reduce the bank’s 
moral hazard problem.       
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2.5  SHOCKS 
 
In this section I discuss four sets of examples. The first three cases show how possible 
shocks among depositors—shifting the proportion of the rich, the monitoring cost, and 
the information of the past failing probability—affect people’s behavior and social 
welfare. Then, the last case illustrates the shock on banks—varying the random 
gambling return—affects people’s behavior and social welfare.  
 
2.5.1  The Effects of Varying the Percentage of the Rich 
In this section I consider the effect if increasing the proportion of the rich depositor, q. 
The welfare comparison is shown in Figure 2.6 panel (a) If the percentage of the rich 
depositors increases, the expected deposits save in the bank is increasing. Once the 
resource deposits to the bank increases, the proportion a bank invests in the risk asset 
may increase in response. However, there is a relatively larger portion of depositors will 
monitor the bank’s risk taking behavior.  
Under the partial deposit insurance system, the higher the percentage of 
depositors who belong to the rich, the less likely the depositor will be insured completely 
if the bank fails. Thus, the expected withdrawal from the depositor might increase and 
market discipline will improve social welfare. How does this shock influence the FDIC’s 
decision? Ceteris paribus, as the rich percentage increases, as we find in 2.6 panel (c), 
instead of charging a high premium, effective market discipline may be a good way to 
reduce the bank’s risk-taking behavior. On the other hand, more available funds could 
finance the bank’s investment. Thus, the bank tends to gamble more and puts depositors 
at risks. As a result, as we can see from Figure 2.6 panel (b), the effect of varying the 
percentage of the rich depositor is unclear for the optimal coverage. 
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Figure 2.6  The Effect of Varying the Rich Percentage: q  
 
 
 
2.5.2  The Effects of Varying the Monitoring Cost 
Under the partial deposit insurance, depositors face trade-off. The benefit from 
monitoring is to have a chance to withdraw early and to avoid the potential losses. The 
opportunity cost of monitoring is the interest from saving. The higher the monitoring 
cost, the less the available funds depositors can save to the bank if monitoring. Since the 
funds saved to the bank generate interests, depositors will receive less interests earning. 
Thus, the higher the monitoring cost, the less likely for depositors to monitor. If that is 
the case, the bank may engage more in risky investment activities without market 
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discipline from depositors. Intuitively, as the monitoring cost increases, the advantage of 
the partial deposit insurance diminishes.  
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Figure 2.7  The Effect of Varying the Monitoring Cost: d 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 panel (a) shows the effect of varying the monitoring cost. Surprisingly, 
the welfare increases when we vary the monitoring cost. Since the higher the monitoring 
cost reduces the incentives for depositors to monitor, the bank has relatively abundant 
resources to finance its investment. That is why the bank’s expected return may rise. If 
the bank’s expected return dominates the total welfare, we can observe that rising 
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monitoring cost increase social welfare. In Figure 2.7 panel (b), optimal coverage limit 
drops while the monitoring cost increases. If the monitoring cost is too high, market 
discipline is weakened. Under this situation, how the FDIC motivates depositors and 
threatens the bank’s excessive risk-taking behavior is to lower the coverage. Lower the 
coverage will stimulate depositors’ monitor. As a consequence of the lower coverage, 
the less premia will need to finance the insurance if bank fails. 
 
2.5.3. The Effects of Varying the Information of the Past Failing Probability 
The information of the past failing probability, *FP , will influence a depositor’s 
monitoring decision. If the depositor chooses to save the monitoring cost and does not 
monitor, she/he cannot accurately tell the bank’s failing probability. The only way for a 
depositor to estimate the bank’s gambling behavior and its failing probability is to use 
past information. The greater the past failing probability, the more likely the rich 
depositor believes that the bank will gamble this period; and more likely the depositor is 
to predict she/he will lose the amount uninsured by the partial deposit insurance. The 
more uncovered funds the rich depositor might lose the more effort the depositor is 
willing to put into monitoring. Therefore, the bank’s risk-taking behavior will be 
suppressed by the higher past failing probability.  
In Figure 2.8 panel (a), when the past failing probability becomes higher and 
higher, it will reduce depositors’ incentive to save and the depositors’ expected return. 
Also, the bank expects the likelihood of depositors’ early withdraw is increasing when 
depositors observed a relatively higher bank’s failure from the past information. 
Therefore, the bank will invest prudently and the expected return from the bank will be 
lower. If a relatively higher probability of bank’s failure in the past is due to the 
unobservable risky banking practice, the FDIC tends to lower the optimal coverage limit 
even more to stimulate market discipline from depositors’ monitoring. 
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Figure 2.8  The Effect of Varying the Past Failing Probability: *fP  
 
 
 
2.5.4  The Effects of Varying the Variance of the Gambling Return 
Unlike the safe asset, I assume that the return of the gambling asset is a Normally 
distributed random variable with parameters ( )2,σR .  
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Figure 2.9  The Effect of Varying the Variance of the Random Gambling Return: σ 
 
 
 
At the beginning of each period, the bank makes its investment decision by 
choosing the combination of the prudent and risky assets. Therefore, both the bank’ 
survival probability and the optimal choice of the gambling asset are highly related to 
the variance of the random return. The greater the variance of this gambling asset, the 
higher the chance the bank is going to fail and has zero return. It becomes less likely for 
the bank to take the risk even if the expected return of the risky asset is higher than the 
prudent asset. Also, if the bank engages more in prudent assets, the lower the risk 
premium the FDIC will charge. However, in Figure 2.9 neither the coverage nor the risk 
premium reflect the effect of the higher variance of the gamble return. 
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2.6  CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is not hard to understand why countries might want to adopt a deposit insurance 
scheme as a safety net after experiencing severe banking crises. In the previous 
literature, there are multiple roles attributed to deposit insurance: to restore the public’s 
confidence in a time of crisis, to move away from continuing economic breakdown, and 
to protect mostly the small depositors.  
The design of the “proper” deposit insurance scheme is still debatable. Even for 
the deposit insurance system in the US which has existed for more than a half century, 
the economic authorities still face a key challenge: how to deal with the bank’s moral 
hazard problem. After reviewing the literature about banking regulations, Bhattacharya, 
Boot, and Thakor (1998) argue that market mechanisms such as cash-asset reserve 
requirements, risk-based capital requirement, risk-sensitive deposit insurance premium, 
and partial deposit insurance may all be effective in dealing with the moral hazard 
problem. Our model has incorporated capital requirements, risk-sensitive premium, and 
partial deposit insurance in a general equilibrium setting.  
Both capital requirements and risk-sensitive premia are suggested in the literature 
as effective ways to help manage a bank’s risk-taking behavior. We introduce the partial 
coverage of deposit insurance that can help in the effort to manage the moral hazard 
problem. Because of the partial coverage (as opposed to full coverage), depositors have 
an incentive to do part of the monitoring of the bank’s risk-taking behavior, threatening 
banks with the withdrawal of deposits if necessary.  
Our model is a partial equilibrium model, where banks display risk-taking 
behavior, depositors are ex-ante heterogeneous, and there is a benevolent insurance 
company providing deposit insurance. I find that a social welfare improvement can be 
achieved by this mechanism design. Moreover, when the partial coverage limit is in 
place, banks are better off, balancing the exchange of the higher deposit premia and the 
depositor’s monitoring and potential withdrawals.  
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Analyzing this coverage-determination process has practical importance in two 
major areas. For the countries that have a well established deposit insurance system for a 
long period of time, the optimal coverage limit derived in our model provides the 
possibility to resolve the moral hazard in banking system, and further, prevent the risk-
oriented bank run by reinforcing the market mechanism. More importantly, for the 
countries that have adopted the implicit deposit insurance or that are without any explicit 
depositor’s protection in place, our model provides a theoretical basis supporting the 
introduction of a deposit insurance system. A properly-designed deposit insurance plan 
not only protects the small depositors but also reduces economic instability.  
The aim of this paper has been to understand the trade-off between the protection 
among depositors and bank risk taking when it comes to the issue of the properly-
designed deposit insurance system. There are some possible directions in which the 
paper could be extended. One way to foster market discipline and boost the monitoring 
and supervision from the side of depositors is to introduce co-insurance.14 Co-insurance 
would require that depositors share the pre-specified potential losses from the failure of 
an insured bank regardless of the size of their deposits. Required contractually at the 
beginning of the period, this coinsurance system seems to reinforce depositors’ market 
discipline compulsorily. I should be able to discuss the questions such as how to 
determine the optimal share for depositors to bear, and what the impact of coinsurance is 
on the risk-enhancing moral hazard problem.  
Our model is currently in real terms, but might be used to address real-world 
concerns regarding nominal coverage limit s and inflation. In the U.S. the current 
coverage limit, $100,000, was set in 1980. The American Banker Association has 
proposed to double the current limit. It may be interesting to find the optimal timing and 
frequency of adjustment of the coverage limits in the face of nominal adjustment costs 
and inflation. Furthermore, countries with high and volatile inflation rates may face 
particular difficulties in the timing and frequency of coverage limit adjustments. Issues 
of indexing and other solutions may provide avenues for future study.  
                                                 
14 According to Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004), relatively fewer countries such as Chile, Colombia, 
Poland and the United Kingdom have adopted co-insurance system. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES 
IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 
 
I build a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small, open economy that displays 
nontrivial demands for fiat currencies, unanticipated sunspots, and financial/banking 
crises originated by sudden stops of foreign capital inflows. The goal is evaluating the 
performance of alternative exchange rate regimes and associated monetary policies. I 
show the existence of multiple equilibria that may be ranked based on the presence of 
binding information constraints and on welfare. Moreover, I can show that there is a 
strong association between the scope for existence and for indeterminacy of equilibria 
and the underlying policy regime. I also find that the presence of binding multiple 
reserve requirements may help in reducing the scope for financial fragility and panic 
equilibria. 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The problems that lay at the heart of the Asian crises are no doubt the overexpansion of 
credit and the increase in risky behavior by banks in the domestic financial system. The 
abrupt reversal in the market conditions took the form of a sudden stop of foreign credit 
and the collapse of the confidence of the people, triggering a widespread financial crisis. 
This paper studies the interaction between monetary policies and alternative exchange 
rate regimes to ascertain the probability of a crisis, building from the characteristics of 
the Asian-crises countries in 1997. There is no general agreement as to what the 
appropriate policies are for the countries that have experienced a severe financial crisis. 
To curb the pressure of the inflation and defend the domestic currency, a country should 
implement a tight monetary policy. In our paper, we introduce binding reserve 
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requirements as one form of tight monetary policy. Another example would be a closed 
economy in which a contraction of the money supply presses the interest rate upwards. 
This effect may aggravate the burdens of the financial institutions and banks, which 
might close due to insolvency. Besides, the fundamental weaknesses of the domestic 
banking sector in the countries of interest have called for the reform of the capitalization, 
such as increases of the capital requirements and the reserve requirements in financial 
institutions and in the banking system. 
Intentionally, this paper does not aim to show how successful the monetary 
policy was either in defending the currencies in a time of a crisis or in managing the 
contagious spread among financial markets. Our goal is to concentrate on the role of 
monetary policy in the form of reserve requirements, in preventing the banking crises 
under a diverse setup of the exchange rate regimes.  
To build a framework that allows us to analyze the issue just described, we use 
three building blocks to take us to our goal step by step. The first is to model the 
behavior of the participants in the domestic banking system. There is a strong agreement 
on the fact that the reason behind the Asian crises is located in the private sector: 
domestic banks in the countries of interest were overextended and had a negative debt 
position with the rest of the world. Unlike other previous crises originated from fiscal 
imbalances and/or government deficits, the Asian crises shed light on the increased risky 
behavior and the overexpansion of the banking system. This unique characteristic of the 
Asian crises provides us with a structural environment to study the connection among 
the banking system and several macroeconomic issues motivated by the crises. Hence, 
we propose to design our model economy as one of the individual East Asian country 
affected by the crisis in 1997. 
The second block is to introduce different exchange rate regimes since the 
choices of monetary policy may vary under the associated exchange rate arrangement. It 
is a well-established fact that for economies open to international capital flows, the 
choice of exchange rate regime plays a central role in explaining the vulnerability and 
fragility of financial markets, as well as domestic price stability and long-run viability. 
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Therefore, our model studies the effect of the constant growth rate of domestic money 
supply and reserve requirements under the floating exchange rate regime while the 
domestic money supply is endogenously determined in the setup under fixed exchange 
arrangement. 
The third block is to identify what the causes of the crises were. According to 
Kaminsky (2003), we are aware that currency crises may originate by a diversity of 
factors, and she finds six varieties: 
 
…Four of those varieties are associated with domestic economic 
fragility, with vulnerabilities related to current account deterioration, 
fiscal imbalances, financial excesses, or foreign debt sustainability. But 
crises can also be provoked by just adverse world market conditions, 
such as the reversal of international capital flows. The so-called sudden-
stop phenomenon identifies the fifth variety of crises. Finally, as 
emphasized by the second-generation models, crises also happen in 
economies with immaculate fundamentals. Thus, the last variety of 
crises is labeled self-fulfilling crises.15  
 
In the model, we consider two possibilities when introducing crises. A crisis comes to 
our model either in the form of the sudden stop of foreign credit or in the form of 
panicking among domestic depositors. We put most of our effort to analyze the former 
because it is consistent with the real situation at the time of the Asian crises. However, 
we do not neglect the implicit reason aggravating the crises, the self-fulfilling panic and 
run. 
The purpose of this study is to reinforce and fill in the missing association 
between the overexpansion of the financial system, banking crises, and exchange rate 
regimes/monetary policy. Thus, we focus our attention on the aforementioned linkage, 
which we believe is of the utmost importance for most open economies. Our general 
                                                 
15 Kaminsky (2003), p. 2. 
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intention is to evaluate the performance of alternative exchange rate arrangements and 
associated monetary policies. With this in mind, we build a Dynamic General 
Equilibrium Model -with micro-foundations- replicating a small, open economy with a 
nontrivial banking system. To fix ideas, we propose to design our model economy as an 
individual East Asian country affected by the crisis in 1997. 
The previous literature has documented extensively the events of the East Asian 
crisis of 1997. A remarkable example is the paper by Goodhart and Delargy (1998), 
which compares the East Asian crises in 1997/98 with the financial crises of 1870-1914. 
According to the authors, these two sets of crises share some common characteristics. 
First, they have a common origin in the over-expansion of the private sector in Emerging 
Market Economies that are net debtors with the rest of the world. Second, the countries 
of interest displayed rapid growth, with booms in foreign capital inflows and in asset 
markets. Third, the overexpansion of the private investment activity and the fragility of 
the banking system were apparently connected. Fourth, there was evidence of financial 
contagion between these countries. However, the authors also establish that most 
differences between these two sets of crises arise from the underlying exchange rate 
regimes: fixed exchange rates earlier versus flexible exchange rates later. 
There seems to be a general agreement on the fact that Indonesia, South Korea, 
and Thailand were the countries most affected by the East Asian 1997/98 crisis, 
followed by Malaysia, Laos and the Philippines. It stands to reason that, up to a 
significant extent, these countries share some common characteristics and that they 
display a similar structural environment to study the implementation of particular 
policies. Clear examples of such similarities lie in the structure and behavior of the 
financial sector. Before the currency crises in these countries, there was a boom in 
private borrowing. The sources of financing of this boom were mostly non-performing 
or low-performing loans due to the risky-lending behavior by banks. Lindgren et al 
(1999), and Kishi and Okuda (2001) establish also that there was an apparent lack of 
sound financial structure that only got worse with the ill-oriented process of financial 
and capital liberalization in most of these countries. In addition, the financial assets of 
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banks represented an extremely high fraction of the banks’ total assets -as opposed to 
financing in capital markets, and borrowing from foreign banks represented a significant 
portion of the domestic banks’ loans. Finally, most of these countries had intermediate 
pegs in place at the onset of the crisis. According to the standard chronology of the crisis, 
the floating of the baht in July 1997 in Thailand apparently triggered the crisis. A 
subsequent change in expectations led to the depreciation of most currencies in the 
region, bank runs, and rapid withdrawals of foreign capital. The consequence was a 
dramatic economic downturn, in particular in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand. 
We must also mention that these countries displayed as well significant 
differences in the speed and magnitude of the economic recovery in the aftermath of the 
crises. As an example, we can mention that real fixed investment and the growth of real 
GDP had almost returned to their pre-crisis levels in South Korea in the first two years, 
but they continued to fall in Indonesia. We intend to provide with a plausible explanation 
of the observed diversity in the recovery processes in these countries by evaluating the 
variations in the effective exchange rate regime in place and its associated monetary 
policies. 
It is a well-established fact that for economies open to international capital flows, 
the choice of exchange rate regime plays a central role in explaining the vulnerability 
and fragility of financial markets, as well as domestic price stability and long-run 
viability. In the past decade, economies open to international capital flows16 have been -
and still are- in the process of moving away from intermediate pegs, some toward harder 
pegs (such as currency boards or arrangements with no separate legal tender), but more 
towards systems with greater exchange rate flexibility. However, the evidence does not 
appear to support a particular exchange rate regime and, thus, whether is better to fix or 
to float is still an open issue17. Finally, we also argue that when the nominal exchange 
rate is left to float and, of course, there is no intervention of the monetary authority in the 
                                                 
16 Mostly, economies classified as developed or emerging markets by the IMF. See Fischer (2001). 
17 For example, see Bencivenga, Huybens and Smith (2002), Calvo and Reinhardt (2002), and Hernandez-
Verme (2004). 
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market for foreign exchange (dirty floating), alternative monetary targets may imply 
different de facto exchange rate regimes.  
Tables 3.1.A  and 3.1.B summarize the exchange rate arrangements in the Asian 
countries. At the time when the East Asian countries opened their economies to 
international capitals, most of them switched towards more flexible exchange rate 
arrangements. Thus, during most of the 1980s and the first part of the 1990s, Indonesia, 
Korea, Thailand and Malaysia had managed floating arrangements –an intermediate peg, 
while Philippines had free floating. However, there were some important differences 
after the 1997 twin crises: Philippines continued with free floating, Indonesia, Korea and 
Thailand moved from intermediate pegs to free floating as well, but Malaysia had a very 
hard peg in place.  
The model in this paper shares the influence of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and 
Chang-Velasco (2000a, 2000b, 2001). Henceforth, we will use D-D as short for 
Diamond and Dybvig, and C-V as short for Chang and Velasco. Among the most 
desirable properties displayed by financial institutions in the D-D framework, we must 
mention the banks’ real role in allocating, defined by the design and implementation of 
deposit contracts that provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets. D-D 
also offers a theoretical understanding of why bank-run-equilibria can be costly even 
under deposit insurance. However, the original D-D framework modeled a closed 
economy. Then, we must take this framework further, and use it in the context of the 
study of a small, open economy such as a typical East-Asian crisis country. 
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Table 3.1.A  Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes in the East Asian Countries 
Period Exchange Rate Regime Classification 
Country 
From To Narrow Classification Broad Classification 
Hong Kong Jul-72 Oct-74 Peg to U.S. dollar Fixed 
 Nov-74 Oct-83 Independently floating Floating 
 Oct-83 Dec-04 Peg to U.S. dollar Fixed 
Indonesiaa/ Jan-83 Jul-98 Managed floating Intermediate 
 Aug-98 Jan-02 Independently floating Floating 
Japan Jan-70 Dec-72 Bretton Woods basket peg Fixed 
 Jan-73 Dec-04 Independently floating Floating 
Korea,  
Rep. of 
Aug-76 Dec-79 Peg to U.S. dollar Fixed 
 Jan-80 Nov-97 Managed floating Intermediate 
 Dec-97 Dec-04 Independently floating Floating 
Malaysia Jan-70 Jun-72 Peg to pound sterling Fixed 
 Jul-72 Jun-73 Peg to U.S. dollar Fixed 
 Jul-73 Aug-75 Independently floating Floating 
 Sep-75 Mar-93 Limited flexibility w.r.t. a basket Intermediate 
 Apr-93 Aug-98 Managed floating Intermediate 
 Sep-98 Dec-04 Peg to U.S. dollar Fixed 
Philippines Oct-81 Jun-82 Limited flexibility w.r.t. U.S. dollar  Intermediate 
 Jul-82 Sep-84 Managed floating Intermediate 
 Oct-84 Dec-04 Independently floating Floating 
Singapore Aug-73 Jun-87 Limited flexibility w.r.t. a basket Intermediate 
 Jul-87 Dec-04 Managed floating Intermediate 
Thailanda/ Jan-77 Feb-78 Peg to U.S. dollar Fixed 
 Mar-78 Jun-81 Limited flexibility w.r.t. a basket Intermediate 
 Jul-81 Mar-82 Managed floating Intermediate 
 Apr-82 Oct-84 Limited flexibility w.r.t. U.S. dollar Intermediate 
 Nov-84 Jun-97 Limited flexibility w.r.t. a basket Intermediate 
 Jul-97 Jun-98 Managed floating Intermediate 
 Jul-98 Jan-02 Independently floating Floating 
a/ The information from the Central Bank of Indonesia (floating) is different from that of the IMF 
(managed floating) after the year 2002. The same happens in Thailand. Source: Frankel et al (2002). 
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Table 3.1.B  Exchange Rate Regimes in the East-Asian Countries 
Before the Crisis and After the Crisis 
Country Before/During the crisis After the crisis 
Japan Free floating Free floating 
Philippines Free floating Free floating 
   
China Managed floating Managed floating 
Indonesia Managed floating Floating 
Korea Managed floating Floating 
Singapore Managed floating Managed floating 
Thailand Managed floating Managed floating → floating 
   
Malaysia Managed floating Fixed 
   
Hong Kong Fixed Fixed 
Source: Frankel et al (2002). 
 
 
 
About 20 years after D-D, Chang and Velasco had a series of illuminating 
discussions on extending some aspects of the D-D model to the study of the fragility of 
banking systems and exchange rate crises for a small, open economy. However, the C-V 
model ignored the central role played by the fiat nature of money in today’s world: in the 
C-V framework, people hold a currency because they derive utility from it, which in 
itself attaches intrinsic value to what they intend to be fiat money. In our paper, we try to 
take fiat money seriously, and introduce non-trivial demands for alternative fiat 
currencies: domestic and foreign. Thus, we consider that one of the contributions of our 
paper is in the way we introduce fiat money. In particular, we consider a single type of 
domestic deposits, and banks must hold a fraction of these deposits as currency reserves. 
Then, fiat money enters our model by the regulation that governs the multiple reserve 
requirements in this economy. Moreover, banks must hold two types of unremunerated 
currency reserves: reserves denominated in domestic currency and reserves denominated 
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in foreign currency18. Therefore, there is meaningful nominal exchange rate in our 
model, and this nominal exchange rate will be determined according to the exchange rate 
regime and the monetary policy in place.  
 
 
 
Table 3.2  Reserve Requirements on Local and Foreign 
Currency Deposits for Selected Countries, End December 1996 
 
Country 
Reserve 
requirement 
on LCD 
Reserve 
requirement 
on FCD 
Denomination 
of reserves held 
on FCD 
Participation of 
FCD in total 
deposits 
 (%) of 
LCD 
(%) of FCD  (%) 
Argentina 17.0 17.0 F 50.0 
Bolivia 10.0 20.0 F 92.0 
India 10.0 0.0 n.a. n.a. 
Japan 1.3 0.3 L 5.1 
Malaysia 13.5 13.5 L n.a. 
Peru 9.0 45.0 F 74.7 
Philippines 17.0 0.0 n.a. 48.4 
Russia 10.0 5.0 L 36.5 
Turkey 8.0 11.0 F 49.3 
Vietnam 10.0 10.0 F 29.8 
Legend: LCD = Local Currency Deposits; FCD = Foreign Currency Deposits. Source: Baliño et al 
(1999) 
 
 
 
We must mention the recent discussion in the literature that highlights the 
important role of such reserve requirements as a policy tool that can be instrumental in 
monetary control as well as capital controls and/or capital flow stability19. Table 3.2 and 
Table 3.3 summarize the reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits and the 
relative regulations of the banking system in some of the East Asian countries and other 
selected countries. For example, during the early 1990s, both Malaysia and Thailand 
used increases in reserve requirements during periods of heavy capital inflows as a 
mechanism to control the infusion of foreign capitals in the domestic economy. Finally, 
                                                 
18 See Hernandez-Verme (2004) for the original discussion. 
19 See for example Reinhart and Reinhart (1999) and Ariyoshi et al (2000). 
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our model also benefits from the use of a dynamic framework in an economy with an 
infinite horizon, as is the Overlapping Generations framework. 
Self-fulfilling prophesies and strategic complementarities are very helpful 
concepts that may account for the presence of multiple equilibria in stationary 
allocations. The potential for the realization of self-fulfilling prophesies is ever present 
in alternative versions of the Overlapping Generations model with outside assets in 
general, and models with one or more fiat currencies in particular. The recent literature 
on open economy macroeconomics has used intensively self-fulfilling prophecies as a 
tool that may lead to very important underlying explanations for financial fragility, 
currency crises and/or speculative attacks.20 In such contexts, the presence of 
informational and institutional frictions in economic models with micro-foundations can 
exacerbate situations that are already problematic, such as credit rationing, financial 
repression and endogenously arising volatility, complicating the standard analysis of 
separating and pooling equilibria. Our model, as a dynamic general equilibrium model 
with micro-foundations of a small, open economy where there is uncertainty and 
informational frictions, shares the potential for both insight and analytical complications. 
Then, the matter of the source and form of uncertainty is a very important one, together 
with the appropriate utilization of the information and action sets available to agents at 
all points in time. We borrow heavily from the non-monetary version of C-V (2001) 
which is very standard to study this type of problems. 
However, we believe that we improve on the way in which we introduce and 
treat potential crises. In particular, one argument of the C-V framework was that when 
the probability of a crisis is public information, each agent in this economy must use this 
information when contemplating optimal plans of action at the beginning of every 
period, and, as result, the optimal behavior of agents is invariant with respect to whether 
the crisis was realized or not. Alternatively, we introduce the potential for uncertainty of 
the crisis by using a sunspot variable: a random variable unconnected to the 
fundamentals of the economy and that expresses the extrinsic uncertainty. We also 
                                                 
20 Cole and Kehoe (1996) and Obstfeld (1996) are very interesting examples of these applications. 
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consider the potential for intrinsic uncertainty, in the form of sudden stops of foreign 
credit.  
 
 
 
Table 3.3  Regulations on Reserve Requirements in Selected Asian Countries 
Regulation/ 
Country Liquidity requirements Reserve requirements 
Remuneration of 
the Required 
Reserves 
China 
Ratio of outstanding loans to 
deposits must not exceed 
75%. Ratio of current assets 
to current liabilities must be at 
least 25%. 
  
India 
Minimum liquidity is 25% of 
deposits of scheduled 
commercial banks. Cash-
reserve ratio is 11%.  
Upper limit on reserve 
requirement is 15%. 
 
Indonesia None. 
Statutory reserve in Rupiah 
should be 5% of 3rd party fund 
in Rupiah; statutory reserve in 
foreign currency should be 3% 
of the 3rd party fund in foreign 
exchange. 
None 
Malaysia 15% of eligible liabilities. 4% of eligible liabilities. None 
Philippines 
Of 9% against peso deposits, 
and deposits that are 
substitute liabilities of 
universal and commercial 
banks. 
Of 4% for deposits maintained 
with the BSP (up to 40% of 
the total reserve requirement); 
Of 9% for time and saving 
deposits, etc. 
 
Singapore 18% 3% 
Depends on the 
maturity of the 
financial asset 
and market rates. 
Thailand 
Of 6% of total deposits of all 
types. Of 6% of total foreign 
short-term borrowing. Of 6% 
of total borrowing with return 
linked to variables. 
 
None 
Source: Kishi and Okuda (2001) http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/kokkin/tyousa/tyou041g.pdf  and World 
Wide Web http://microfinancegateway.org/ 
 
 
 
In summary, we model a small, open economy that reproduces several aspects of 
the East-Asian countries at the time of the crisis. The private sector is a net debtor of the 
rest of the world, and there is an exogenous upper limit to foreign credit at each point in 
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time. Ex-ante identical domestic agents face an uncertainty whose realization is private 
information. There is a standard problem in coordination that may lead to crises of a 
self-fulfilling type. Our set up allows us to study the effects of sudden stops and bank 
runs, and how do they relate to each other. Domestic and foreign fiat currencies may 
circulate in the economy, and domestic investment is subject to multiple, unremunerated 
reserve requirements that take the form of currency reserves. Then, we model two such 
economies that are similar in every respect, except for their choice of exchange rate 
regimes. The first economy has floating exchange rates, and we intend to replicate the 
main characteristics share by Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand after the crisis. 
We evaluate the performance of two alternative monetary policies that will lead to 
different de facto exchange rate regimes: a constant rate of money growth versus a 
policy of inflation targeting. In the second economy, a fixed exchange rate regime is in 
place, and we intend to replicate the main characteristics of Malaysia after the crisis. 
Our results show the existence of multiple equilibria that we may rank based on 
the presence of binding information constraints and on welfare. Moreover, we can show 
that there is a strong association between the scope for existence and for indeterminacy 
of equilibria and the underlying policy regime. We also find that the presence of binding 
multiple reserve requirements may help in reducing the scope for financial fragility and 
panic equilibria. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the first 
model economy, a small, open economy where a floating exchange rate regime is in 
place and no crises are possible in equilibrium. We then analyze not only the properties 
of stationary and dynamic equilibria but also consider the effects of two alternative 
monetary policies. Banks have access to foreign borrowing of different dates and 
maturities at fixed world interest rates, displaying a nontrivial maturity structure that 
may determine the existence and type of equilibria. In Section 3, we present the second 
model economy, a small, open economy where there is a very hard peg (a fixed 
exchange rate regime) but yet again, crises do not obtain. Next, in Section 4, we 
introduce the possibility of crises by introducing extrinsic and intrinsic uncertainties. We 
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formulate the re-optimization problem by banks after a sudden stop. We also emphasize 
the interaction between standard monetary policy and a policy of multiple reserve 
requirements, and we show how it will affect the equilibrium results in our model. 
Finally, in Section 5, we present the main conclusions of the analysis, and discuss its 
limitations and potential for future research. 
 
3.2  A FLOATING EXCHANGE RATE REGIME: INDONESIA, KOREA, 
PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND AT THE TIME OF THE CRISIS 
 
In this section, we build a model of a small, open economy that captures the main 
stylized characteristics shared by the Indonesian, Korean, Filipino and Thai economies at 
the time of the crisis. At this point, we do not allow for events that could lead to a crisis 
of any type. The model is in the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and Chang and 
Velasco (2000a, 2000b and 2001). In this small, open economy, the private sector is a 
net debtor of the rest of the world, and there is an exogenous upper limit to foreign credit 
faced by domestic banks at each point in time. Ex-ante identical domestic agents face an 
uncertainty whose realization is private information, and there is a standard problem in 
coordination that may lead to crises of a self-fulfilling type. Domestic and foreign fiat 
currencies may circulate simultaneously in the economy, and investment is subject to 
multiple, unremunerated reserve requirements (that are binding, in general) that take the 
form of currency reserves. A flexible exchange rate regime is in place, and there are no 
legal domestic restrictions on either using foreign currency or on obtaining foreign 
credit. We consider two alternative monetary policies to accompany the floating 
exchange rates: a policy of a constant (and exogenous) rate of money growth and a 
policy of inflation targeting. Each one of these policies may imply a different de facto 
exchange rate regime. 
In the remainder of this section, we describe the features of the model as well as 
the main results in an economy where no crises are possible. 
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3.2.1  The Environment 
We consider a small, open and pure exchange economy consisting of an infinite 
sequence of two-period lived, overlapping generations. Time is discrete, and indexed by 
t=0, 1, 2, 3, ... . 
Each of the future generations consists of a continuum of agents with unit mass. 
We will use the terms young and old for agents in their first period of life and in their 
second period of life, respectively. Agents are ex ante identical, but they can become of 
one of the following types: impatient, with probability )1,0(∈λ , and patient, with 
probability )1( λ− . As we will see later on, impatient agents will derive utility from 
consuming at the end of their youth, while patient agents will derive utility only from 
consuming in their old age. At t=0, there is a generation of initial old. The initial old 
consist of a continuum of old individuals with unit mass. A fraction (1-λ) of these initial 
old are of the impatient type. 
We separate each period into two sub-periods: the morning and the afternoon. 
Interaction and trade will be different in each sub-period. In summary, young agents may 
do different things in the morning than in the afternoon, and the same applies to old 
agents. In this set up, as we will see later in the paper, banks will turn out to be coalitions 
of individual agents, they are competitive, and we can assume then they are identical. 
The latter facilitates the analysis by allowing the examination of only a representative 
bank. 
 
3.2.1.1  Endowments and Preferences 
Each period, there is a single tradable good. This good is homogeneous across countries, 
and agents all over the world cannot produce it. When young, agents receive w units of 
the single good, first thing in the morning. Old agents receive no endowments. 
If an agent who is born at time t turns out to be of the impatient type, she will 
consume tc1  units of the single good at the end of period t, while she is still young, and 
she will derive the utility ( ) ( )tt ccu 11 ln= . However, if this agent turns out to be of the 
patient type instead, she will consume 1,2 +tc  units of the good at the end of time t+1, 
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when old, and she will derive the utility ( ) ( )1,21,2 ln ++ = tt ccu . Accordingly, the expected 
utility of an individual agent born at time t would be 
 1211,21 ln)1(ln)],([ ++ −+= tttt ccccuE λλ  (3.1) 
 
3.2.1.2  Storage Technology 
All young agents and domestic banks have access to the following storage/investment 
technology: for one unit of good invested in the beginning of period t, the agent receives 
the return 1>R  goods at the end of t+1. However, she would receive only a return of 
1<r  if she were to liquidate the investment early, at the end of period t. The only 
available technology for the short-term investment is this same storage technology. For 
instance, if an agent liquidates early, she would get the return 1<r  per good at the end 
of period t, and if she stores the proceeds again between the end of period t and the end 
of period t+1, then she will get the return Rrrr <<=⋅ 12  per good at the end of period 
t+1. Thus, long-term storage technology dominates early liquidation in rate of return. 
 
3.2.1.3  The Informational Structure 
While all agents are ex-ante identical at the time of birth, they face uncertainty at the end 
of their first period of life. At this point of time, they will learn whether they are of the 
impatient type or of the patient type. A young agent will be of the impatient type at the 
end of her first period of life with probability )1,0(∈λ . Of course, the same young agent 
would be of the patient type with probability )1( λ− . The parameter λ  is public 
information, and realizations of types are i.i.d. across agents and over time. However, the 
type of an individual agent is private information: once an individual realizes her type, 
only that individual herself knows her true type, giving rise to a standard private 
information problem. The latter will have serious implications for the design of deposits 
contracts that banks can offer. 
Given the structure of information in our model, only agents of the patient type 
can credibly pretend to be of the impatient type. To do so, and to avoid capture, an 
individual of the patient type who misrepresents her type would have to withdraw as 
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many goods from the bank as an individual of the impatient type would at the end of 
period t ( )tc1 . However, an individual of the patient type who behaves according to her 
true type would withdraw 12 +tc  goods from the bank at the end of t+1. Then we could 
write a truth-telling condition as 
 tt rcc 112 ≥+  (3.2) 
Equation (3.2) holds as an incentive-compatibility or self-selection condition that allows 
no motivation for patient agents to misrepresent their types and, that, therefore, forces 
agents to behave according to their true type. 
 
3.2.1.4  Multiple Fiat Currencies 
Two fiat and outside currencies may circulate in the small, open economy at any point in 
time. The monetary authority in the domestic country issues one of them. Mt is the 
outstanding nominal stock of domestic currency at the end of period t and pt denotes the 
domestic price level. The domestic price level tp  represents the number of units of 
domestic currency that individuals need to exchange for one unit of the good at time t. In 
addition, foreign currency may circulate in the domestic economy. We use Qt to denote 
the outstanding stock of foreign currency in the domestic country, at the end of period t. 
The price of the good in the rest of the world *tp  represents the number of units of 
foreign currency that individuals need to exchange for one unit of the good at time t, and 
it is exogenous. We use te  to denote the nominal exchange rate, measured as the number 
of units of domestic currency exchanged for one unit of foreign currency. Then, 
0
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p  are the gross real rates of return on domestic and foreign 
currency, respectively. For simplicity –and without loss of generality, we also assume 
that the foreign rate of inflation is exogenous and constant over time, meaning that the 
gross real return on foreign currency satisfies 
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p , where 1* −>σ  is the 
exogenous net inflation rate in the rest of the world. 
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Finally, we assume there is free international capital mobility in this small, open 
economy, and that there are no legal restrictions to the use of foreign currency in the 
domestic country. Purchasing Power Parity also holds in equilibrium, so that ttt ppe =*  is 
satisfied. 
With respect to the general guidelines for domestic monetary policy, the 
monetary authority in the domestic country accomplishes all injections and/or 
withdrawals of domestic currency through lump-sum transfers. In particular, each young 
agent will receive the equivalent of tτ  goods ex ante, at the beginning of period t, 
regardless of type. We have two reasons behind our choice of this particular scheme of 
monetary transfers: first, we minimize the presence of an adverse selection problem, and 
second, we do not require the monetary authority to have additional information that 
could be of a private nature21. 
At t =0, there is an initial-old generation that behaves as any old agent from the 
future generations would. In particular, a fraction λ−1  of these initial old individuals 
would be of the patient type, and, thus, would like to consume in their old age. In 
standard models with overlapping generations, the initial conditions of the economy 
describe the initial stock of the different assets that exist in the economy, and they play a 
key role. Typically, the initial stocks of assets indicate the “endowments” of the 
members of the generation of initial old individuals .There are two initial conditions in 
this economy: the nominal supplies of domestic and foreign currency at t=0. Thus, we let 
00 >M  and 00 >Q  denote the nominal supply of domestic and foreign currency in the 
small open economy, respectively, and they are in the hands of the initial old. The 
members of the initial-old generation of the patient type all have an equal share of the 
initial money supplies. Thus, each initial old would have the equivalent of 
( ) ( ) 0
00
0
0
11 p
Qe
p
M
λλ −+−
 goods at the beginning of period t = 0. 
                                                 
21 We must point out that, in this framework, the question of “who gets what and when” is not a trivial 
one, and different answers to it may have a crucial influence on the equilibrium results. The transfer 
scheme we propose may not be neutral, in the sense that it may affect the self-selection constraint. In 
Appendix B-1, we present alternative results for the case where the monetary authority gives transfers only 
to young agents who claim to be of the impatient type, after the realization of types. 
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3.2.2  Financial Intermediation 
In this section, we explain the nature of banks, as well as the role they play in this small, 
open economy. We follow the standard Diamond-Dybvig set up, where individuals make 
deposits of all of their endowments in banks, and banks act purely as financial 
intermediaries. In this environment, a bank is simply a coalition of individual agents. 
Given the latter, we may treat all of these financial institutions as identical and then 
focus on the behavior of a representative bank. 
In this environment, banks arise endogenously and they pool together the 
resources owned by individuals at the beginning of their lives. This allows banks to offer 
individuals partial insurance against uncertainty of their potential types, and provide 
them with allocations that are Pareto superior to autarky. In the context of a small, open 
economy, as mentioned by C-V (2000), domestic agents may also benefit from pooling 
their resources and acting together, if such economy does not display aggregate 
uncertainty. This is the case in our model. 
A bank that is a coalition of individuals born at the beginning of period t, starts in 
business at the beginning of period t as well. Following the standard practice in the 
literature, a representative bank will behave so that it maximizes the expected utility of 
individual agents in our model economy, given by equation (1). This will be in their best 
interest as well, given that banks are coalitions that represent collections of individual 
agents. 
 
3.2.2.1  Access to Foreign Credit Markets 
In this economy, only banks may access the world credit markets. Domestic banks may 
trade with the rest of the world in several primary debt markets, and the debt instruments 
available may provide them with a variety of terms and/or dates of maturity. Henceforth, 
when we use the term “banks” without further qualification, we refer to banks that start 
in business at the beginning of time t. 
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Domestic banks have access to three different foreign-debt instruments, at 
different points in time. The first foreign-debt instrument is a short-term loan that starts 
at the beginning of period t and matures at the end of period t; we use otd  to denote the 
amount traded of this asset, and 0*0 >r  to denote the associated gross real interest rate. 
We can also think of this first instrument as intra-period debt. The second asset is also a 
short-term foreign-debt instrument, but this loan starts at the end of period t and matures 
at the end of period t+1; we use td1  to denote the amount that banks trade of this asset, 
and 0*1 >r  is the corresponding gross real interest rate. The last foreign-asset available 
is a long-term loan that starts at the beginning of period t and matures at the end of time 
t+1; we use td 2  to denote the amount traded of this long-term asset by domestic banks, 
and 0*2 >r  is its gross real interest rate. We follow the standard practice in the literature 
by assuming that 0*0 >r , 0*1 >r  and 0*2 >r  are time-invariant and exogenous gross real 
interest rates that are determined in the corresponding foreign credit market. 
We will henceforth restrict our attention to allocations where the domestic 
country is a net borrower from the rest of the world, as was the case in most East-Asian 
countries at the time of the crisis. Thus, banks always hold non-negative positions of all 
instruments of foreign debt, implying that 00 ≥td , 01 ≥td , and 02 ≥td . We will see 
later that the amounts borrowed from the rest of the world cannot all be zero at the same 
time. 
In addition, a domestic bank starting operations at the beginning of period t will 
face exogenous foreign-borrowing constraints at times t and t+1. We can write these 
foreign-borrowing constraints as 
 020 fdd tt ≤+  (3.3) 
and 
 121 fdd tt ≤+  (3.4) 
Both 0f  and 1f  are measured in goods. Then, 00 >f  in equation (3.3) is the exogenous 
maximum amount that domestic banks starting operations at the beginning of t can 
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borrow from the rest of the world at time t: intra-period debt and long-term debt. 
Similarly, 01 >f  in equation (3.4) is the exogenous maximum total amount of debt 
maturing at the end of t+1 that a bank starting operations at the beginning of t can 
borrow from the rest of the world. 
 
3.2.2.2  Fractional-Reserves Banking and Multiple Reserve Requirements 
The structure of multiple reserve requirements in our model follows Hernandez-Verme 
(2004) in that all investment done by domestic banks is subject to the financial 
regulations of the domestic country22. Domestic banks must hold some of these reserves 
in the form of domestic currency, and hold another part of these reserves in the form of 
foreign currency. In particular, let ( )1,0∈dφ  denote the fraction of deposits that the 
banks must hold in the form of domestic currency. When held from t to t+1, domestic 
currency reserves earn the gross real rate of return ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+1t
t
p
p . Similarly, ( )1,0∈fφ  denotes 
the fraction of deposits that banks must hold in the form of foreign currency. Foreign 
currency reserves held between t and t+1 earn the gross real rate of return ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+
1
1
tt
tt
pe
pe . 
Obviously, we will assume that 1<+ fd φφ . Finally, we must mention that we will 
focus on allocations where both reserves requirements are binding. This will transpire if 
R
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p
t
t <⎟⎟⎠
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p
t
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⎞
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⎛
+
*
1
*  both hold. 
 
3.2.2.3  The Timing of Transactions 
In our model, there are no transactions among individual agents of any age or type, 
either domestically or with the rest of the world. All transactions take place through the 
banks. Thus, banks in this model are inherently financial intermediaries. 
Figure 3.1 describes the sequence of events and choices by a representative 
member of a typical future generation, which is born at t and dies at the end of period 
                                                 
22 We further assume that all agents investing domestically must hold currency reserves. 
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t+1. These individuals live for four sub-periods: the morning of period t, the afternoon 
of period t, the morning of period t+1, and the afternoon of period t+1. We now proceed 
to describe the transactions that take place each sub-period. 
The morning of period t: Young individuals are born first thing in the morning of period 
t. These young individuals have two sources of funds at this point: their endowment of 
w  units of the single good, and the monetary transfer of tτ  goods from the monetary 
authority. These young individuals make deposits in banks. In particular, young agents 
deposit inelastically the total of whatever resources they have at this time. Hence, 
deposits in banks amount to tw τ+  goods per young agent. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1  Sequence of Events 
 
 
 
On the other side of the financial market, we have the banks. Of course, banks 
receive deposits from young individuals. The banks have also the ability to borrow funds 
from the rest of the world –which individual agents do not have. Then, banks have two 
t 
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sources of funds in the morning of time t that they can dispose of. The first source is the 
amount deposited by individuals, but they must set aside first the required currency 
reserves. Then, the amount of deposits that banks can utilize in the morning of time t is 
( )( )tfd w τφφ +−−1  goods. The second source of funds is total credit obtained from 
abroad at the beginning of t, in the form of intra-period and long-term debt, tt dd 20 + . 
Banks combine these resources together in order to finance a long-term investment that 
uses the domestic storage technology. Let tk  denote investment in this long-term asset. 
Then, we can express the budget constraint the representative bank faces at the 
beginning of period t by using the following inequality: 
 ))(1(20 tdfttt wddk τφφ +−−++≤  (3.5) 
The afternoon of period t: Individual agents learn their types early in the afternoon of 
time t. An impatient agent derives utility from consuming tc1  at that point in time, while 
a patient agent will derive utility only from consuming 1,2 +tc  goods at the end of the next 
period. Then, banks need to pay the withdrawals by all agents claiming to be of the 
impatient type. Given that λ  is public information, all the banks know that there are 
only λ  individuals of the impatient type23. If each agent claiming to be of the impatient 
type withdraws, then banks would only allow total withdrawals amounting to tc1λ  
goods. Banks must also repay tdr 0
*
0  of principal plus interest of intra-period foreign 
debt. The banks’ have a potential source of new funds at this point: a new short-tem 
foreign loan of td1  goods. In case more funds are required, the banks could liquidate 
early part of the long-term storage/investment. Early liquidation is costly in the sense 
that it obtains the effective return Rr << 1  instead. Then, we can write the budget 
constraint faced by a representative domestic bank at the end of period t as the inequality 
below, 
 tttt drldrc 10
*
01 +≤+λ  (3.6) 
                                                 
23 The banks do not know the identities of the true impatient agents. 
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We must mention also that there is a sequential service constraint in place at the 
end of period t. This means that the bank’s payment to any individual agent who is in the 
line for withdrawals depends only on that agent’s position in the queue of depositors: the 
first to come is also the first served. In case the bank exhausts its resources before 
repaying all foreign loans that are due and all depositors left in the line for withdrawals, 
the bank closes, and any future payments contracted by the bank are lost. 
The morning of period t+1: There are no “active” transactions in this sub-period. Both 
patient agents and banks wait for the durations of this sub-period. If all agents behave 
according to their true type, then all impatient agents have already consumed in the 
morning of time t. 
The afternoon of period t+1: At the end of period t+1, agents of the patient type who 
behave according to their true type wish to withdraw funds from the bank in order to 
finance their old-age consumption of 1,2 +tc  goods each. Repayments of the long-term 
foreign debt ( )tdr 2*2  and the new short-term foreign debt ( )tdr 1*1  are due as well. If the 
bank did not close at the end of period t, then it will use the return of the remaining long-
term investment -given by ( )tt lkR −  goods- together with the gross real return on its 
currency reserves to pay its obligations. The return on these currency reserves is 
( ) ( )στφ ++ 1td w  to reserves held in the form of domestic currency, and 
( ) ( )*1 στφ ++ tf w  to reserves held in the form of foreign currency. It will be helpful to 
notice at this point that one of the consequences of the regulations on reserve 
requirements concerning the financial sector in this economy is that banks have an 
additional source of funds at the end of t+1 –even if they yield each a dominated real 
rate of return. We think this contributes to reduce the likelihood of a panic of patient 
depositors who did not want to withdraw at the end of period t. Then, the budget 
constraint faced by a representative bank at the end of the afternoon of period t+1 can be 
written as the following inequality 
 ))(
1
1())(()()1( *
1
1
*
12
*
212 tft
t
t
dttttt wwp
plkRdrdrc τσφτφλ +++++−≤++− ++
 (3.7) 
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3.2.2.4  Deposit Contracts 
Given the uncertainty in the type of individual domestic agents and the fact that its actual 
realizations are private information, the representative bank must use some kind of self-
selection mechanism to prevent agents from misrepresenting their type. The inequality in 
(2) embeds this truth-telling constraint. 
Autarkic Equilibrium: in the absence of financial intermediation, individuals can only 
access the storage technology. An agent of the impatient type liquidates her investment 
through the storage technology, obtaining ( )twr τ+  goods at the end of period t. Then 
again, an agent of the patient type waits until the end of her second period of life, 
obtaining ( )twR τ+  goods. 
Financial Intermediation: As we have mentioned before, a representative bank is a 
coalition of individuals. As such, the bank will offer a deposit contract consisting of the 
contingent pair ( )1,21 , +tt cc  to individuals. tc1  is the amount offered to agents who claim 
to be of the impatient type and withdraw at the end of period t, while 1,2 +tc  is the amount 
that banks offer to individuals claiming to be of the patient type who wait until the end 
of period t+1. Banks choose the pair ( )1,21 , +tt cc  specified in the deposit contract to 
maximize the objective function (3.1), subject to the constraints (3.2)-(3.7). As in the 
standard D-D model, these deposit contracts may provide individuals with allocations 
that are Pareto superior to those of autarky. In particular, the bank offers partial 
insurance against the uncertainty of types in the deposit contract, so that 
( ) Rccwr ttt <<<+ +1,21τ  holds. 
 
3.2.3  A Floating Exchange Rate Regime with a Constant Rate of Money Growth 
Under a policy that prioritizes a constant rate of growth of the supply of domestic 
currency, the monetary authority dictates the evolution of the nominal supply of 
domestic fiat currency. In this environment, such a policy takes the form of 
 ( ) 0,11 ≥∀+=+ tMM tt σ  (3.8) 
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where 1−>σ  is the exogenous and constant rate of domestic money growth, chosen by 
the domestic monetary authority. Equation (3.8) is a standard first order nonlinear 
difference equation that governs the evolution of the exogenous nominal supply of 
domestic fiat currency. Accordingly, the government budget constraint under this policy 
is 
 )
1
()
1
(1 σ
σ
σ
στ +=+=
−= − t
t
t
t
tt
t zp
M
p
MM  (3.9) 
Notice that ttt pMz ≡  equation (3.9) represents the total as well as the per young 
agent24 real holdings of domestic currency at t. 
 
3.2.3.1  General Equilibrium 
There are several conditions to satisfy in a general equilibrium. We can summarize the 
market clearing conditions under a policy of constant rate of domestic money growth by 
using equations (3.10)-(3.16) below. First, given that the single good is homogeneous 
across countries and there are no restrictions on international goods trade, the purchasing 
power parity condition must hold. Thus 
 *ttt pep =  (3.10) 
In addition, without any restrictions on international capital flows, there is no 
arbitrage between the gross real domestic interest rate and world-determined interest 
rates, after we control for the different length of the maturity periods. Then, we restrict 
our attention to allocations where the following “perfect no arbitrage” condition holds 
 *1
*
0
*
2 rrrR ⋅==  (3.11) 
We focus throughout on situations where the reserve requirements bind. This transpires 
when 
 ( )σ+=> ++ 1
1
1 t
t
t
t
z
z
p
pR  (3.12) 
and 
                                                 
24 Recall that the modulus of the total population is 1. 
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 ( )** 1
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1
1
σ+=> +t
t
p
pR  (3.13) 
Equation (3.14) below describes the clearing in the market for domestic real money 
balances exchanged for goods. In particular, the currency reserves that banks must hold 
in the form of domestic currency pin down the demand for domestic real money 
balances, yielding 
 ( )tdt
t
t wz
p
M τφ +==  (3.14) 
Next, equation (3.15) describes the equilibrium in the market for foreign 
currency in exchange for goods. We now define ttttt peQpQq =≡ *  as the real 
holdings of foreign currency per young agents at t. It is also the case here that the 
currency reserves that banks must hold in the form of foreign currency determine the 
demand for foreign real money balances, and 
 ( )
d
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tft
t
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Qe
φ
φτφ ⋅=+==  (3.15) 
We also find that all equilibria must satisfy 
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Finally, we must also highlight again that, under this policy of floating exchange 
rates with a constant rate of domestic money growth, equation (3.9) describes the 
government budget constraint. 
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3.2.3.2  Steady-State Equilibria 
In this section, we describe separating stationary equilibria where all agents behave 
according to their true type and there are no problems of liquidity. In such allocations, 
there is no early liquidation of the long-term investment by banks25. 
In this environment, a stationary allocation is such that the real balances of 
domestic currency per young agent, 01 >==+ zzz tt , are constant over time. As a result, 
the gross real return on domestic currency, ( )σ+=+ 1
1
1t
t
p
p , is constant over time as well. 
Combining equations (3.9) and (3.14), and imposing stationarity conditions, we obtain 
that the real value of the monetary transfer in a stationary equilibrium is equal to 
 ( )d
d w
φσ
σφτ −+= 11  (3.17) 
Notice also that, from equation (3.15), it follows that 01 >==+ qqq tt  holds whenever 
01 >==+ zzz tt  is satisfied, in a stationary equilibrium. In addition, from equation 
(3.16), we obtain that the growth of the nominal exchange rate must also be constant 
over time in a stationary allocation. Specifically, the growth of the nominal exchange 
rate depends on the domestic and foreign monetary policy parameters σ  and *σ , 
obtaining 
 *
1
1
1
σ
σ
+
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t
t
e
e
 (3.18) 
Finally, the amounts borrowed from abroad are stationary for all types of foreign debt-
instrument, and equal to 00 ≥d , 01 ≥d  and 02 ≥d , respectively. The foreign 
borrowing constraints in (3.3) and (3.4) bind. 
                                                 
25 In these type of equilibria we also find that ( )[ ] 0<∂⋅∂ tlL , where ( )⋅L  is the Lagrangean for the banks’ 
problem, and tl  denotes early liquidation of the long-term investment. This condition implies that banks 
do not liquidate investment early, and thus 0=tl  in equilibrium. 
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Thus, we can define a stationary equilibrium as the set of all the triplets 
( ) 0,, >>τqz  and ( ) 0,, 210 >ddd  that are constant over time, where 
( ) ( ) 011 *1 >++=+ σσtt ee  is constant as well. 
We proceed by first checking the conditions for existence of the stationary 
equilibria as well as their bifurcation properties. We next analyze whether these 
equilibria display uniqueness or local uniqueness, followed by an examination of the 
issue of determinacy. 
Existence of Steady-state Equilibria: We summarize our results for this type of 
separating equilibria in Table 3.4. We classify our results into two categories, according 
to the maturity-structure of the foreign interest rates. Equilibria belonging to the first 
category (Case I) display a maturity-structure of interest rates such that the intra-period 
foreign debt is relatively cheaper than the inter-period short-term debt. Thus, 1*0 <r  and 
Rrr => *2*1  obtains for all equilibria in Case I. Alternatively, equilibria belonging to the 
second category (Case II) display a different maturity-structure of interest rates, with 
inter-period short-term debt cheaper than intra-period debt. Then, 1*0 >r  and Rrr =< *2*1  
obtains for all equilibria in Case II. 
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Table 3.4. Existence of Steady-State Equilibria with Ex-ante Transfers 
No early liquidation: 0=tl . A Floating Exchange Rate Regime 
  Case I Case II 
Type of 
Equilibria 
Amount 
Borrowed 
1*0 <r  and Rrr => *2*1  1*0 >r  and Rrr =< *2*1  
No intra-
period 
foreign debt 
02 fd =  
00 =d  
011 ffd −=  
Equilibria exist only 
for values of σ  
sufficiently high. 
Equilibria do not exist. 
Interior 
solution 
02 >d  
200 dfd −=  
211 dfd −=  
Equilibria exist when 
σ  is neither too low 
nor too high. 
Equilibria exist when 
σ  is neither too low 
nor too high. 
No long-
term foreign 
debt 
02 =d  
00 fd =  
11 fd =  
Equilibria exist for 
values of σ  
sufficiently high. 
Equilibria exist for 
values of σ  
sufficiently low. 
 
 
 
In addition, it is possible to observe three different types of equilibria within 
either Case I or Case II. We can describe each one of them as follows: 
a) Equilibria with no intra-period debt 0d . These equilibria are stationary 
allocations characterized by 00 =d , 02 fd =  and 011 ffd −= . We might 
interpret such an equilibrium as one where domestic banks would like to 
borrow arbitrarily large amounts of long-term foreign debt 2d , but the upper 
bound to the foreign borrowing in (3.3) binds, and 02 fd = . 
b) Equilibria with interior solutions for 0d , 1d  and 2d . In such an equilibrium, 
there are nontrivial amounts of each type of loan from abroad, such that 
020 fd << , 0200 >−= dfd , and 0211 >−= dfd . 
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c) Equilibria with no long-term debt 2d . These equilibria are stationary 
allocations where 02 =d , 00 fd =  and 11 fd = . We might interpret one such 
equilibrium as a situation where domestic banks would like to borrow 
arbitrarily large amounts of intra-period foreign debt 0d , but the upper bound 
to the foreign borrowing in (3.3) binds, and 00 fd = . 
We must point out that the stationary equilibria display bifurcations in this 
economy. Bifurcations imply that there are differences with respect to the existence, 
number, type and properties of steady-state equilibria, and they occur mostly due to 
different ranges for the value of the parameter of domestic monetary policy σ . 
The interaction between the maturity-structure of foreign interest rates and the 
domestic policy parameter σ  explains the different equilibrium sets. The structure of the 
interest rates represents the relative cost of borrowing each of the different types of 
foreign-debt, while the rate of domestic money growth indicates the return of the 
currency reserves held by banks. For instance, a bank is more willing to borrow long-
term from abroad when the domestic inflation rate is low instead of high. The same 
applies when the long-term foreign debt is relatively cheaper. In the remainder of this 
section, we describe qualitatively the results on existence as a function of the domestic 
rate of money growth26. 
Stationary equilibria with no intra-period foreign debt exist only in Case I, and 
only when the rate of domestic money growth is high enough. However, when intra-
period debt and long-term debt are relatively expensive (Case II,) equilibria do not exist, 
regardless of the value of σ . 
Alternatively, the existence of equilibria with interior values of all foreign-debt 
requires the domestic rate of domestic money growth not be either too low or too high, 
whatever the underlying maturity-structure of the interest rates. Finally, equilibria with 
no long-term debt do not exist for values of σ  that are low enough in situations where 
                                                 
26 For more details, see Appendix B-2. Notice too that the results on existence as a function of *σ  are 
qualitatively similar. This is mostly because the parameters σ  and *σ  affect the banks’ budget 
constraint given by (7) in the same fashion. 
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intra-period and long-term foreign debt are relatively cheaper (Case I). We observe the 
exact opposite results for situations where inter-period short-term foreign debt is 
relatively cheaper: equilibria do not exist for rates of domestic inflation that are too high. 
Local Uniqueness and Determinacy of Steady-State Equilibria: The issue of multiple 
equilibria raises a new set of questions related to local uniqueness and determinacy of 
equilibria. In standard general equilibrium theory, the construction of the economic 
environment usually ensures that the economy is “regular” 27, i.e. the number of 
equilibria is finite, and, thus, the properties of local uniqueness and determinacy are 
satisfied. However, it is still possible to find economic environments that do not 
constitute “regular” economies, where there is typically a continuum of equilibria. Thus, 
in an economy that is “not regular”, the properties of local uniqueness and determinacy 
of equilibria are typically not satisfied. 
In our set up, even for fixed domestic rates of money growth and foreign 
inflation rates, we typically find that many different stationary combinations of the 
foreign interest rates satisfy the equilibrium conditions. In fact, we obtain a continuum of 
stationary equilibria. Thus, in our model, the stationary equilibria do not display the 
property of local uniqueness, and, therefore, they are indeterminate. 
To fix ideas and to illustrate the absence of local uniqueness, we take the type of 
equilibria with no intra-period debt under Case I. We display the solution in Figure 3.2. 
Notice that, because of perfect no arbitrage, Rr =*2 , which already reduces the 
dimension of the price vector. However, these stationary equilibria lie on the thick gray 
line in the three-dimensional space of the interest rates, and there is a continuum of 
them. Moreover, we can also construct an extra mapping from the foreign interest rates 
to the policy parameter σ , and find all the ranges of values of the domestic rate of 
money growth that are consistent with these equilibria existing. In our diagram, the 
boundaries of such ranges of values of σ  are implicitly defined by the functions ( )σA′  
and ( )σB′ 28. Proposition 3.1 illustrates this fact. 
                                                 
27 For more detail, see Mas-Colell et al (1995), p.591. 
28 See Appendix B-3 for definitions of the boundaries and more detail. 
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Figure 3.2  The Continuum of Equilibria 
 
 
 
Proposition 3.1 In the set of all separating stationary allocations where all agents 
behave according to their true type and there is no early liquidation of the long-term 
investment, there are bifurcation values of the monetary policy parameter σ  that 
determine regions in the space of foreign interest rates. Some these regions are 
inconsistent with the existence of stationary equilibria. There are some other regions 
where steady-state equilibria exist. When equilibria exist, the equilibrium is not unique 
(not even locally), and we will typically observe a continuum of equilibria as 
combinations of the three foreign interest rates. 
 
We describe the details of the results on existence and number of equilibria for the 
different Cases and types in Appendix C. The proof is available upon request from the 
authors. 
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3.2.3.3  Dynamic Equilibria 
Combining equations (3.9) and (3.14) yields the following dynamic system 
 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
++= σ
σφφ
1tddt
zwz  (3.19) 
It is evident from equation (3.19) that this environment is stationary when both currency 
reserve requirements bind, given that the domestic money supply is exogenous under 
floating exchange rates. Therefore, we observe only trivial and immediate dynamics in 
the transition from the initial conditions to the stationary equilibria, but equilibria are not 
truly dynamic. Then, only steady-state equilibria exist in this environment when the 
reserve requirements bind. 
 
3.2.4  Floating Exchange Rates with a Policy of Inflation Targeting 
We now proceed to study a policy of inflation targeting under floating exchange rates. 
Under the policy of inflation targeting, the monetary authority sets once and for all the 
target net rate of domestic inflation to be the constant rate 0, ≥∀ti . The domestic 
nominal supply tM  adjusts to meet this target. Notice that under a policy of a constant 
rate of domestic money growth, the monetary authority chooses the nominal money 
supply exogenously. However, under this policy of inflation targeting tM  adjusts 
endogenously to satisfy the monetary policy rule. 
We define this policy such that domestic prices evolve according to the following 
nonlinear difference equation 
 0,
1
1
1
≥∀+=+
t
ip
p
t
t  (3.20) 
Our framework allows us to compare the existence and properties of equilibria 
under the two alternative monetary policies described in this paper, with floating 
exchange rates. In particular, given the stationarity of the environment when reserve 
requirements bind, the dynamic systems under these two monetary policies are identical 
in situations where the monetary authority sets a domestic rate of money growth ( )σ  
similar to the inflation target ( )i  under the second policy, i.e. i=σ . Thus, there are no 
  
75
dynamic equilibria under any of these two policies, and the properties inherent to the 
steady-state equilibria remain unchanged. 
 
3.3  A FIXED EXCHANGE RATE REGIME: THE CASE OF MALAYSIA AT 
THE TIME OF THE CRISIS 
 
In this section, we consider a small, open economy that operates under a fixed rather 
than a flexible exchange rate regime. As we did in section 3.2, we do not consider the 
cases where crises are possible. As in Hernandez-Verme (2004), we construct this fixed 
exchange rate regime such that a currency board emerges as a special case, and, to 
simplify matters and fix ideas, we restrict our attention to the study of equilibria under 
this particular very hard peg. The intention is to build a model of a small, open economy 
that captures the main stylized characteristics of the Malaysian economy at the time of 
the crisis29. Of course, in all respects except for the exchange rate regime that is in place, 
the economy remains as described in the previous sections. 
 
3.3.1  Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy 
In this section, we consider a fixed exchange rate regime, where the monetary authority 
chooses exogenously and once and for all the nominal exchange rate at the initial period 
t=0. Without loss of generality, we let 0>e  denote the time invariant and exogenous 
nominal exchange rate set by the monetary authority at t=0. Then, the policy parameter 
e  does not change for all periods onward. Under this policy, the central bank must stand 
ready to buy or sell foreign currency at the fixed exchange rate, causing the domestic 
money supply to change as necessary to meet this target. The latter implies that the 
nominal supply of domestic currency is endogenous: by fixing the nominal exchange 
rate, the monetary authority gives up full control of tM . 
                                                 
29 It is possible to argue as well that the model in this section not only represents the Malaysian economy, 
but the Hong-Kong economy as well. 
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The monetary authority may also choose to hold reserves in the form of interest-
bearing, foreign assets. The purpose of these reserve-holdings is to back the domestic 
money supply. For simplicity, we assume there is only one type of interest-bearing 
foreign asset that performs this function. Let *tB  denote the stock of this foreign asset 
held by the monetary authority at the end of period t. By convention, we assume that this 
foreign asset is denominated in foreign currency, and 0~ >r  is the long-term, gross 
foreign real interest rate paid by this asset. Under this regime, the role of the foreign 
reserves is to back a fixed fraction ]1,0(∈θ  of the domestic money supply, according to 
what the Central Bank perceives as necessary. This policy is a variation of the one used 
in Hernandez-Verme (2004)30: at time t=0, the Central Bank sets exogenously the value 
of the policy parameter θ  from within the support set that ]1,0(∈θ  gives. This value set 
for θ  is also time invariant. Then, the following equation governs the evolution of the 
reserves of foreign assets held by the monetary authority 
 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
e
MB tt θ*  (3.21) 
Notice that a currency board arrangement obtains as a particular case, when the 
monetary authority sets 1=θ  in equation (3.21). However, in the remainder of this 
section we consider the more general case of ]1,0(∈θ  
The new regime of monetary and foreign exchange policy thus defined imposes 
additional restrictions on the resources effectively available to the government. For 
instance, a change in the foreign-reserve position of the monetary authority affects the 
resources available to the government as well, and the government’s budget must 
account for it. In addition, the nominal supply of domestic currency is endogenous in 
that it adjusts to keep the nominal exchange rate at the level set by the government, e . 
The government implements any of these changes through lump-sum transfers of tτ  
                                                 
30 Here, we assume for simplicity that there is no backing of domestic deposits. Therefore, the value of the 
parameter ξ  in Hernandez-Verme (2004) is zero in our paper. 
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goods given ex-ante to all young individuals at time t. Then, the resulting government 
budget constraint for this economy is 
 
*
*
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*
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MM −−−
−
−−=τ  (3.22) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (3.22) represents the real value of any 
changes in the nominal supply needed to sustain the fixed nominal exchange rate. The 
second term indicates the effects of any changes in the real foreign-reserve position of 
the government. 
We can rewrite equations (3.21) and (3.22) in terms of real balances of domestic 
currency, ttt pMz ≡ . Then we obtain 
 t
t
t z
p
B ⋅= θ*
*
 (3.23) 
and 
 ( ) 1*1
1~1 −⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−⋅+⋅−= ttt zrz σθθτ  (3.24) 
 
3.3.2  General Equilibrium 
In a general equilibrium, several conditions must be satisfied. First, purchasing power 
parity and “perfect no arbitrage” in equations (3.10) and (3.11), respectively, still hold. 
In addition, as a consequence of this exchange rate regime, the domestic country with 
fixed exchange rates inherits the inflation rate in the rest of the world, and 
 **
1
*
1 1
1
σ+== ++ t
t
t
t
p
p
p
p
 (3.25) 
However, notice that *σ  is not a parameter under the control of the monetary authority. 
After using (3.25) together with (3.16), it is obvious that ( ) 11 =+ tt ee  obtains, 
reflecting the fact that the nominal exchange rate is constant over time. Then, we can 
also combine conditions (3.12), (3.13) and (3.25) and obtain 
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Condition (3.26) signifies that the long-term asset dominates both domestic 
currency and foreign currency in rate of return. Equations (3.14) and (3.15) still hold, but 
(3.23) and (3.24) replace equations (3.8) and (3.9). Obviously, the inequalities (3.5) and 
(3.6), representing the banks’ budget constraints at the beginning and at the end of 
period t, still apply. However, condition (3.7) under the new policy now reads 
 ( ) )(
1
)()1( *1
*
12
*
212 t
fd
ttttt wlkRdrdrc τσ
φφλ ++
++−≤++− +  (3.27) 
 
3.3.3  Steady-State Equilibria 
In this section, we describe the set of separating stationary equilibria where all agents 
behave according to their true type and there are no problems of liquidity, under a fixed 
exchange rate regime (i.e., e  is fixed, and the condition 1≤θ  holds.) As before, there is 
no early liquidation of the long-term investment by banks. 
In this environment, we also define a stationary allocation as a combination of 
the triplets ( ) 0,, >>τqz  and ( ) 0,, 210 >ddd  that is constant over time. Notice that the 
foreign-borrowing constraints defined in (3.3) and (3.4) still apply, and they are binding. 
Combining equations (3.23), (3.24) and (3.14), and imposing conditions for 
stationarity, we obtain that the real value of the monetary transfer under a fixed 
exchange rate regime is 
 
( ) ( )[ ]{ }( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }11~111 11
~11
**
*
−−++−+
−−++=
r
rw
d
d
θσφσ
θσφτ  (3.28) 
It is straightforward to show that ( ) ( )[ ] 11~11 * >−++ rθσ  holds, 1* −>∀σ . Then, to fix 
ideas, we assume that ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ } 011~111 ** >−−++>+ rd θσφσ  holds for the remainder of 
this section, which yields the condition 0>τ  that holds. 
In the remainder of this section, we evaluate the conditions for the existence of 
the stationary equilibria as well as their bifurcation properties. We next analyze whether 
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these equilibria display the local uniqueness property, followed by an examination of the 
issue of determinacy31. 
Existence of Steady-State Equilibria: We summarize our results for this type of 
separating equilibria in Table 3.5. As in Section 3.2, we classify our results into either 
Case I or Case II, according to the maturity-structure of the foreign interest rates. In 
addition, following also the analysis in Section 3.2, it is possible to observe the 
following three different types of equilibria within either Case I or Case II: 
a) Equilibria with no intra-period debt 0d . In such allocations, 00 =d , 02 fd =  
and 011 ffd −=  are obtained. 
b) Equilibria with an interior solution. In such equilibria, there are nontrivial 
amounts of each type of loan from abroad: 020 fd << , 0200 >−= dfd , 
and 0211 >−= dfd  are satisfied. 
c) Equilibria with no long-term debt 2d . In these equilibria 02 =d , 00 fd =  
and 11 fd =  are obtained. 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime like the one presented here, domestic and 
foreign inflation are always equal, even in non-stationary allocations. In situations where 
the rate of foreign inflation is high, banks have no incentive to borrow long-term funds 
from abroad because inflation would reduce the real value of the assets that the banks 
would use when such debt is due32. We observe an interaction between the maturity-
structure of foreign interest rates and the inflation rate, now given by *σ . 
 
 
                                                 
31 Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 in Appendix B-1 shows the equilibrium results when the transfers are given 
to the impatient agent. 
32 Such combination of events could lead to a bank run and/or a panic among all agents, if there was 
uncertainty in this respect. 
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Table 3.5  Existence of Steady-State Equilibria with Ex-ante Transfers. 
No early liquidation: 0=tl . A Fixed Exchange Rate Regime 
  Case I Case II 
Type of 
Equilibria 
Amount 
Borrowed 
1*0 <r  and Rrr => *2*1  1*0 >r  and Rrr =< *2*1  
No intra-
period 
foreign 
debt 
02 fd =  
00 =d  
011 ffd −=  
Equilibria exist only 
for values of *σ  
sufficiently high. 
Equilibria do not exist. 
Interior 
solution 
02 >d  
200 dfd −=  
211 dfd −=  
Equilibria exist when 
*σ  is neither too 
low nor too high. 
Equilibria exist when 
*σ  is neither too low 
nor too high. 
No long-
term 
foreign 
debt 
02 =d  
00 fd =  
11 fd =  
Equilibria exist only 
for values of *σ  
sufficiently high. 
Equilibria exist only 
for values of *σ  
sufficiently low. 
 
 
 
Different combinations of foreign interest rates and foreign inflation produce a 
variety of situations that translate into different equilibrium sets. We can understand 
such an interaction because both the foreign interest rates and foreign inflation represent 
costs that banks must face. In particular, the structure of foreign interest rates represents 
the relative cost of borrowing each of the different types of foreign-debt, while foreign 
inflation reduces the real return of the currency reserves held by banks. For instance, the 
banks’ willingness to borrow long-term from abroad increases (decreases) when the 
inflation rate is low (high) or when long-term foreign debt is relatively cheaper 
(expensive.) Notice that high rates of foreign inflation may exacerbate the effect of the 
foreign interest rates: values of  σ* that are excessively high would increase the 
likelihood of violating the budget constrain that banks face at the end of t+1. In the 
remainder of this section, we describe qualitatively the results on existence as a function 
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of the foreign inflation rate. Notice that the results on the existence of stationary 
equilibria under a fixed exchange rate are qualitatively very similar to that under floating 
exchange rates, leaving aside, of course, that domestic and foreign inflation are equal 
under the former. 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, stationary equilibria with no intra-period 
foreign debt exist only when such a debt is relative cheaper (Case I.) Moreover, one of 
the following three cases applies: i) equilibria do not exist; or ii) equilibria exist only 
when foreign inflation is neither too low nor too high; or iii) equilibria exist only for 
values of foreign inflation that are high enough. Alternatively, when intra-period debt 
and long-term debt are relatively expensive (Case II,) these equilibria do not exist, 
regardless of the value that σ* takes. In addition, equilibria with interior values for all 
foreign-debt instruments require foreign inflation to be neither too low nor too high, 
regardless of the underlying maturity-structure of the interest rates. 
With respect to equilibria where banks do not borrow long-term from abroad are 
qualitatively different according to the maturity-structure of foreign debt. When Case I 
obtains, we can observe one of the following three cases: i) equilibria do not exist; or ii) 
equilibria exist only for values of σ* that are not too low or too high; or iii) equilibria 
exist only when the foreign inflation is high enough. Things are somehow different 
under Case II; one of the three following situations may obtain: i) equilibria do not exist; 
or ii) equilibria do not exist for values of foreign inflation that are too high or too low; or 
iii) equilibria exist only when the foreign inflation is high enough. 
Uniqueness and Determinacy of Steady-State Equilibria: Under a fixed exchange rate 
regime, we still find many different combinations of foreign interest rates that satisfy the 
equilibrium conditions, even for fixed values of the foreign inflation rate. In fact, this 
economy is “not regular”, and there is a continuum of stationary equilibria as well under 
a fixed exchange rate regime. Thus, the stationary equilibria do not display the property 
of local uniqueness, and, therefore, they are indeterminate. Moreover, none of the 
stationary allocations is a “regular equilibrium.” 
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It is straightforward to show that we can extend the analysis in Appendix C to the 
case of fixed exchange rates. The proof is available upon request from the authors. 
In Proposition 3.2, we compare the locally uniqueness and indeterminacy 
properties that obtain in equilibrium under the different exchange rate regimes. 
 
Proposition 3.2: The existence of the steady-state equilibria under both floating and 
fixed exchange rate regimes is strongly conditioned on the domestic policy parameter σ , 
for floating exchange rates, and foreign inflation σ* for a fixed exchange rate regime. In 
general, we would observe that *σσ ≠ . The latter implies that, a priori, the scope for 
existence and indeterminacy are also different under alternative exchange rate regimes. 
However, they are not strictly comparable without further information, making it 
difficult to rank the alternative regimes in this respect. 
 
3.3.4  Dynamic Equilibria 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the dynamics originates from the government 
budget constraint, and the fact that both the money supply and foreign reserve holdings 
must adjust to keep the nominal exchange rate at its set level. Specifically, by combining 
(3.24) with (3.14), we obtain the following first order linear difference equation 
 ( ) ( ) 1*2*1 −⋅+= tt τσησητ  (3.29) 
We have rearranged terms in equation (29) so that: 
 ( ) ( )θφ σ
θθφ
ση −−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−+−⋅≡
11
1
1~1 *
*
1
d
d rw  (3.30) 
and 
 ( ) ( )θφ σ
θφ
ση −−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−≡
11
1
1~
*
*
2
d
d r
 (3.31) 
On the one hand, notice that ( ) 011 >−− θφd  always holds regardless of the foreign 
inflation rate. On the other hand, the inequality *1
1~
σθ +<r  may hold for values of 
*σ  
  
83
that are low enough.33 The consequences in terms of the implied dynamic behavior of 
this economy under a fixed exchange rate regime are significant. Particularly, in 
situations where ** cσσ >  holds, the dynamic paths are monotonic, and the eigenvalue 
can be either inside or outside the unit circle. Alternatively, when ** cσσ <  obtains, the 
eigenvalue ( ) 0***2 <> cσσση , and it lies inside the unit circle. Thus, the dynamics are 
non-monotonic, leading to potential endogenously arising volatility in the absence of 
shocks. 
The dynamic system under fixed exchange rates is decoupled, meaning that zt 
and qt (the real money balances held by banks) inherit their dynamics from the monetary 
transfer. The same applies to the banks’ operative budget constraints (3.5), (3.6) and 
(3.27). 
 
3.4  POSSIBILITY OF A CRISIS AND THE VULNERABILITY OF BANKS 
 
We now allow for the possibility of a crisis in our model of the financial system. 
Consider the environment described in sections 3.2 and 3.3, but now with two new 
different sources of uncertainty. The first type of uncertainty is extrinsic, in that it does 
affect the depositors’ beliefs but without relating to the fundamentals of the economy. 
The second type of uncertainty is intrinsic because there is an unexpected change in one 
of the fundamentals of the economy. In particular, we use the intrinsic uncertainty to 
replicate a sudden stop: an unanticipated and exogenous reduction of the amount of new 
credit from the rest of the world. Each of these types is independent of the other in our 
framework. We now describe things in more detail. 
Extrinsic Uncertainty: We introduce a shock to the depositors’ beliefs. The literature 
frequently illustrates the properties of this type of shock by using the example of a “bad 
dream” of the young domestic depositors. This “bad dream” originates in events that 
                                                 
33 That is, for values of foreign inflation such that 1~
1** −≡< θσσ rc  holds. 
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have to do with the depositors’ system of beliefs, but are unrelated to the fundamentals 
of the economy (e.g. a sunspot.) We will see later in this section, that under a particular 
set of circumstances, this “bad dream” can have a strong effect on outcomes, and it may 
lead to panic-equilibria, where generalized bank-runs obtain from a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
Intrinsic uncertainty: It takes the form of a sudden stop of foreign credit. In our 
environment, we interpret a sudden stop of foreign credit as a permanent but unexpected 
reduction of f1 > 0. The amount f1 was initially and exogenously set, at the beginning of 
period t. This constraint on foreign credit was binding but banks had not acted on it yet. 
The sudden stop hits the economy right before the end of period t, and the new amount 
available of foreign credit at the end of period t decreases significantly. We use 1f ′  to 
denote the new foreign credit available at the end of t, and 110 ff <′≤  obtains. The 
aforementioned reduction is public information, and it may reduce both liquidity and 
solvency in the financial sector34. Thus, a sudden stop in this framework can trigger a 
domestic crisis that takes the form of generalized bank runs, bankruptcy and closure in 
the domestic financial system. 
We must point out that, in the absence of either extrinsic or intrinsic uncertainty, 
domestic agents will withdraw from banks according to their true type, and domestic 
banks anticipate this perfectly. Then, there is no need to liquidate the long-term asset 
early. In addition, there is not illiquidity or lack solvency that banks or depositors cannot 
anticipate. At the beginning of period t, the domestic banks have chosen the amounts of 
consumption offered in each contingent state of the world: 01 >tc  for impatient 
individuals and 01,2 >+tc  for patient individuals. The banks had formulated a plan that 
involved also 00 ≥td , 01 ≥td , 02 ≥td , and 0=tl , but banks made effective only their 
choices of td0  td 2  and tk  before the shock at the end of period t. 
                                                 
34 We could also argue that unanticipated reduction in foreign credit may trigger a shock to the preferences 
of depositors. If such a shock induces a crisis of a self-fulfilling nature, this may only exacerbate the 
existing problems in this economy. In this paper, for simplicity, we abstract from this possibility. 
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However, when a shock to the depositors’ beliefs or a sudden stop occurs, and it 
becomes publicly available information, the availability of future resources changes 
irreversibly. Then, it may be in the depositors’ best interest to withdraw as much as they 
can immediately. The presence of a sequential service constraint may only exacerbate 
this problem. Thus, it may not be optimal for any agent –specially, agents of the patient 
type- to wait for the next period to withdraw from the banks, since they believe that 
banks could be facing bankruptcy and closure. In particular, both banks and depositors 
may need to re-optimize to account for the change in circumstances, leading to what we 
call a Sequential Checking Mechanism of both their liquidity and solvency. Figure 3.3 
illustrates the main points of the Sequential Checking Mechanism. Thus, after a shock of 
one of the types discussed above hits the small, open economy, a re-evaluation of the 
changes in the liquidity of banks is of the first priority. The new plan is defined by the 
pair ( )tt ld ~,~1 . Depending on the results obtained in this evaluation, circumstances may 
require an analysis of the solvency of the banking system as well. To fix ideas, we now 
proceed to describe the definitions of liquidity, solvency and incentive compatibility 
associated with our framework for a small, open economy. 
Liquidity: Chang and Velasco (2000a, 2000b and 2001) were among the first in the 
literature to mention the need to evaluate the liquidity position of banks in the context of 
financial crises in the emerging markets. They propose to use an illiquidity condition 
that summarizes the current situation of banks after a shock hits the domestic economy 
at the end of period t, assuming that a bank cannot commit not to liquidate fully the 
long-term investment if needed. 
On the one hand, the real value of the bank’s short-term obligations due at the 
end of period t is tt drc 0
*
01 +  goods, if all the depositors withdraw their deposits. On the 
other hand, if the bank were to liquidate early the full amount of its long-term 
investment at the end of time t, it would obtain tt rkl =~  goods35. Therefore, the 
                                                 
35 Recall than, in the absence of either extrinsic or intrinsic uncertainty, there was no early liquidation in 
equilibrium, and thus 0=tl  obtained. When we allow for either one of these two types of uncertainty, 
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representative bank has an illiquid position when the real value of its short-term 
obligations at the end of period t exceeds the liquidation value of the long-term 
investment, or equivalently, when the following inequality holds: 
 ttt rkdrc >+ 0*01  (3.32) 
Of course, when the inequality in (3.32) does not obtain, we say that the bank has a 
liquid position. 
We must also mention, however, that an illiquid position is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for a bank-run equilibrium or bankruptcy in our model. The short-
term resources of the bank may be insufficient at the end of t, but the bank could still be 
solvent next period if it is temporarily bailed-out. Then again, we also need to evaluate 
whether the representative bank is solvent or not. 
Solvency: Even in the case where we find that the representative bank is illiquid by 
using condition (3.28), it is still viable to save it if we can show that the bank is solvent, 
and its illiquid position is just a temporary problem. Alternatively, if the bank is 
insolvent and illiquid, it is probably not a good idea to bail it out at the end of period t. 
We can summarize this idea with the following saying: “why throw away good money 
after bad money?”  
When discussing the issue of solvency, the resources involved include not only 
trk  but also the real value of foreign debt newly chosen at t, 11
~0 fd t ′≤< . We say that 
the representative bank is solvent if this bank still has enough resources left after 
covering both the withdrawals of deposits and foreign intra-period debt, even if the bank 
were to liquidate early the total of its long-term investment. Equivalently, the following 
inequality describes the conditions for the insolvency of a representative bank at the end 
of period t: 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
and a shock is realized, individuals may re-optimize, and the new choice of early liquidation would be 
tt ll ≥~ . 
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Figure 3.3  The Sequential Checking Mechanism 
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 tttt drkdrc 10
*
01
~+>+  (3.33) 
The inequality in (3.33) means that if the real value of the new short-term foreign 
debt td1
~  (i.e., the bail out) is enough to alleviate the temporary problem of liquidity, then 
it would be in the best interest of the foreign creditors to help this bank out instead of 
forcing it to close. 
Incentive Compatibility: The last step is to check whether the Incentive Compatibility 
constraint in (3.2) is satisfied or not. Banks can be illiquid and solvent, but it is still 
possible that the allocation is not incentive compatible, leading to panics and closure. 
We now illustrate the clear logic behind these three conditions with an example. 
If a bank does not have enough resources to deal with all the withdrawals today, we say 
that this bank has an illiquid position. However, if the solvency condition holds, 
individuals may still believe that the bank is worth saving by an adequate inflow of new 
short-term foreign debt. In order to reach a final decision, they must also check that the 
Incentive Compatibility constraint holds. 
We now classify all the possible outcomes into four types. These types may arise 
within either Case I or Case II. 
a) Equilibrium of Type 1: Banks have a liquid position. Under these 
circumstances, banks are liquid and solvent, and there are no panics. We will 
call a situation like this a separating non-panic equilibrium where banks hold 
liquid positions. 
b) Equilibrium of Type 2: Banks have an illiquid position, but they are solvent 
and the Incentive Compatibility constraint is satisfied. Under this set of 
circumstances, the bank is illiquid but no panics occur. We will consider such 
an outcome a separating non-panic equilibrium where banks hold illiquid 
positions. 
c) Equilibrium of Type 3: Banks have an illiquid position, they are solvent, but 
the Incentive Compatibility constraint is not satisfied. Then, banks are 
illiquid and solvent but there are panics in equilibrium, and all banks must 
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close. We will call this outcome a pooling equilibrium with panics but 
solvent banks. 
d) Equilibrium of Type 4: Banks have an illiquid position and they are 
insolvent. Panics occur in equilibrium, and all banks must close. This 
situation is a pooling equilibrium with panics, illiquid and insolvent banks. 
It is straightforward to show36 that we may rank these different types of 
equilibria according to the social welfare that obtains in each case. We establish that: i) 
equilibria of Type 1 Pareto dominate equilibria of Type 2, Type 3 and Type 4; ii) 
equilibria of Type 2 are Pareto superior to equilibria of Type 3; and iii) equilibria of 
Type 3 dominate equilibria of Type 4. 
In the next two sections, we describe briefly the relationship between financial 
fragility, a bad dream of depositors or a sudden stop of foreign credit. The Table 3.6 
below may be helpful for keeping track of all the different types and their implications. 
 
 
 
Table 3.6  Different Types of Equilibria 
Separating Equilibria→No Panic Pooling Equilibria→Panic 
Type 1, liquid banks Type 3, illiquid and solvent, not 
Incentive Compatible 
Type 2, illiquid but solvent banks, 
Incentive Compatible 
Type 4, illiquid and insolvent 
banks 
 
 
 
3.4.1  A Bad Dream by Domestic Depositors 
In this section, we describe briefly the potential effects on the economy by an 
unanticipated shock that is totally unrelated to the fundamentals of the economy. 
Suppose that a young individual has a bad dream. When she wakes up before the end of 
period t, she has the very strong belief that banks will close soon (before period t ends.) 
                                                 
36 This proof is available upon request from the authors. 
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Given the strategic interdependence and coordination problems that are present in this 
environment, individuals realize that their personal welfare depends not only on their 
actions but they depend as well on the actions of other individuals in the economy. In 
particular, we observe complementarity in the strategic interaction between the 
individual depositors. Therefore, if an individual agent cannot observe the actions or 
types of others, she may panic if she believes that everyone in the economy has had the 
same bad dream. In other words, if she believes that everybody else is going to run, she 
runs as well. As a result, all domestic depositors would try to run to the banks to 
withdraw their resources immediately with the purpose of getting there before any other 
individual in the economy does, and we would have a self-fulfilling bank run in our 
hands. 
To be able to replicate these results, we introduce a sunspot variable that reflects 
extrinsic uncertainty as perceived by the domestic depositors. A bad dream is just one 
example of the form that such a sunspot variable may take. The previous literature has 
documented extensively the effects that this particular type of uncertainty could have 
when it obtains together with strategic complementarity in the interactions of the 
individuals. Thus, we will not dig further in this respect. However, we must mention that, 
in our framework, the realization of the sunspot variable typically takes place at the end 
of period t, after the individuals learn their types. What happens next is not trivial, but it 
just follows the sequential checking mechanism that we described in Figure 3. The 
previous literature has described extensively the general works of this mechanism. We 
apply it with some minor variations: to check liquidity, then solvency and finally 
incentive compatibility. 
 
3.4. 2  A Sudden Stop of Foreign Credit 
The second question that interests us is what features of this model allow for the 
existence of the intrinsic uncertainty that takes the specific form of a sudden stop of 
foreign credit. To mimic a sudden stop, we consider an unanticipated but permanent 
reduction of total foreign credit 1f  at the end of period t. Such permanent shock is public 
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information. As before, we assume that the domestic country is a net borrower from the 
rest of the world, and that it faces a binding borrowing constraint in each period. Recall 
that 11 ' ff <  denotes the new and lower amount of foreign credit available to domestic 
banks at the end of period t. The new credit constraint exacerbates any problem of credit 
rationing that may have existed previously, and it may severely cripple the domestic 
financial sector. Notice also that, after t, all the future generations will face the same new 
credit constraint. 
 
3.4.2.1  The Re-Optimization Problem 
At the beginning of the period t, banks choose their plan of action based upon the 
information set },{ 10 ff . Banks formulate their plans by maximizing the ex-ante expected 
utility of a representative individual, subject to the relevant constraints. At the end of 
time t, banks learn the realization of 11 '0 ff <≤ . This realization constitutes an 
irreversible reduction in the future resources available to banks that merits a revision of 
plans. Under '1f , it may be possible that some decision rules that were optimal before are 
not optimal anymore. However, at this point in time, only two choice variables remain 
elastic: td1  and tl , since ttt kdd ,, 20  and the reserve-holdings were chosen and made 
effective at the beginning of t (and, are thus inelastic.) Banks may choose to deviate 
from their original plans. They would do so by finding a new combination ( )tt ld ~,~1  that is 
optimal under the new circumstances. 
After the sudden stop hits the domestic financial sector, this news is public. The 
sequence of events that follows are: after the shock, everybody realizes that the amount 
of new borrowing from abroad is less than it was when they formulated their original 
plans. Fortunately, people can still try to behave optimally by sequentially checking the 
situation of the banks. Thus, the need to re-optimize and re-formulate their plans triggers 
a new sequential checking to try to determine the best course of action under the new 
circumstances, and equilibria obtain accordingly. 
The new borrowing constraint faced by banks at the end of period t implies that 
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 tt dfd 211 '
~ −≤  (3.34) 
The sequential checking mechanism now requires re-evaluating (3.32), (3.33) and (3.2) 
by taking into account (3.34) as well. Banks now try to maximize the expected utility in 
(3.1) subject to the new budget constraint in (3.34), and the relevant budget constraints 
according to the exchange rate regime. 
 
3.4.2.2  Equilibrium Results - Overview 
In the remainder of this section, we describe the results for existence of each of the four 
different types of equilibria. We must emphasize that the existence and type of 
equilibrium will also depend on the particular “draw” of 1f ′ . In particular, when 1f ′  is 
still large enough, we find that there is a potential for avoiding self-fulfilling crises due 
to potential high expectations and low doubts by domestic depositors. When this obtains, 
the economy will gravitate more towards equilibria of Type 2 than Type 4. People do not 
worry about a bankruptcy even if the bank is illiquid. 
However, under other circumstances, the financial system can be extremely 
fragile and volatile: either banks are liquid and solvent (equilibria of Type 1,) or they are 
illiquid and insolvent, leading to financial panic and closure. 
 
3.4.2.3  Equilibria of Type 2 versus Equilibria of Type 4 
A Type-2-equilibrium is such that banks are illiquid, solvent and the outcomes are 
incentive compatible. For a Type-3-equilibrium to obtain, the outcome must violate 
incentive compatibility instead. Equilibria of Type 4 are the worst possible outcome that 
can obtain, in terms of welfare: banks are illiquid and insolvent (and the issue of 
incentive compatibility does not matter much.) Tables 3.7 and 3.8 illustrate our results 
for Case I and Case II, respectively, under Floating Exchange Rates37. We can partition 
the space of all possible equilibria into five sub-sets, depending on the value of the pair 
( )tt ld ~,~1  that obtains. We define each one of the sub-sets as follows: 
                                                 
37 We can also extend these results to cases where a fixed exchange rate is in place. We do not do so here 
due to space constraints. The interest reader can obtain these results upon request from the authors. 
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a) Sub-set 1: allocations such that ( ) ( )ttt kfld ,~,~ 11 ′=  obtains 
b) Sub-set 2: ( ) ( )0~,~,~ 11 >′= ttt lfld  in equilibrium 
c) Sub-set 3: ( ) ( )0,~,~ 11 fld tt ′=  obtains in equilibrium 
d) Sub-set 4: ( )tt kd ,0~1 >  is satisfied in equilibrium 
e) Sub-set 5: equilibrium allocations where ( )0,0~1 >td  holds. 
We must mention at this point that, under very special circumstances, it is 
possible to find some sub-sets in the space of all potential equilibrium allocations that 
are always incentive compatible. In a situation like the one just described, equilibria of 
Type 2 may become equilibria of Type 4 if they violate the solvency condition, but 
equilibria of Type 3 never obtain. Alternatively, in situations where it is not possible to 
guarantee incentive compatibility, we must find the appropriate sub-set where liquidity, 
solvency and self-selection intersect in the space of foreign interest rates and monetary 
policy parameters. 
Case I. ),1( *2
*
1
*
0 Rrrr =><  under Floating Exchange Rates: Table 3.7 presents our 
results when Case I obtains. Notice that all allocations are incentive compatible and, thus, 
we can rule out the existence of equilibria of Type 3. Alternatively, we can find that the 
conditions for the existence of equilibria of Type 2 or of Type 4 are possible to satisfy in 
all sub-sets. Thus, we can observe equilibria where the financial system is very fragile, 
leading to panics and generalized bankruptcy. 
  
Table 3.7  Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of Equilibria of Type 2 and Type 4 under Floating Exchange Rates. 
Case I: 1*0 <r , Rrr => *2*1 , with 10 << dφ  and 10 << fφ  
Re-
Optimized 
Amounts 
Bound 1 – from Illiquidity 
(A) 
Bound 2 – from Solvency 
(B) 
Incentive 
Compatibility 
(C) 
Equilibrium of 
Type 2 exists if 
Equilibrium 
of Type 4 
exists if 
1. '~ 11 fd t =  
tt kl =~  
)()1( 0
*
0 tkrfr ⋅−⋅⋅− λ  tkrfr ⋅−⋅ 0*0  Guaranteed BfA ≤′< 1  1fBA ′<<  
2. '~ 11 fd t =  38 
0~ >tl  
( )
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−
+⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
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⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−−⋅
*
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)(1
r
R
r
wH
R
rr tfd τφφ
 ( )
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−
+⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−−⋅
*
1
)(1
r
R
r
wH
R
rr tfd τφφ
 
Guaranteed AfB ≤′< 1  ABf ≤<′1  
3. '~ 11 fd t =  
0~ =tl  
tkrfr ⋅⋅+⋅⋅− λλ 0*0)1(  tkrfr ⋅⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−+⋅ λ
λ
10
*
0
 
Guaranteed BfA ≤′< 1  1fBA ′<<  
                                                 
38In this case, ( ) ( ) ( )tt wHRrrRffrl τλλλ +⋅⋅⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⋅′−⋅= 1*110*0 , where )()()1( *
1
*
1 ++
++−−≡
t
t
f
t
t
dfd p
p
p
pRH φφφφ . Notice also that ( ) 01 <⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−−⋅ H
R
rr fd φφ  obtains in 
this case, requiring the condition 01 *1 <⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛− r
R
r  to hold, to ensure that 0'1 >f  is satisfied. Moreover, the condition 110 ff <′<  must be satisfied for a country that is a net borrower with 
the rest of the world. 
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Table 3.7(Continued) 
Re-
Optimized 
Amounts 
Bound 1 – from Illiquidity 
(A) 
Bound 2 – from Solvency 
(B) 
Incentive 
Compatibility 
(C) 
Equilibrium 
of 
Type 2 exists 
if 
Equilibrium 
of Type 4 
exists if 
4. 0~1 >td  39 
tt kl =~  
( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) ])1[(])1(1[11 )()1(1 *1*0*0*0*0*1 0
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1
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1
rrrrrr
wDfCrr t
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( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
⋅−−≡ λλ
λ *0
*
1
*
0
*
0
*
0
1
11 rr
r
rr
r
rC , ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−⋅
⋅−−+−−⋅⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
⋅−−+⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −≡ **
0
*
1
*
0
*
0
*
0
111
11
1
1
11
11 σ
φ
σ
φλφφλλ
λ fd
fd rr
r
r
r
r
D
, ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⋅−⋅−⋅−−−≡ *
1
*
0*
0
1
1
r
r
rrrF
λλλ  and 
( ) 0
11
11 **
1
>⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+−−⋅≡ σ
φ
σ
φφφ fdfd rrJ
. Notice also that, with respect to the condition that must be satisfied to guarantee solvency, only the case where 
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τλ  yields a set of relevant economic allocations. Therefore, we focus on allocations where this is true. 
40 In this subset, 
Rr
wHffR
d tt =
+⋅⋅+−⋅= *
1
10
1
)()'( τλ  obtains. 95 
  
Table 3.8  Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of Equilibria of Type 2 and Type 4 under Floating Exchange Rates. 
Case II: 1*0 >r , Rrr =< *2*1 , with 10 << dφ  and 10 << fφ  
Re-
Optimized 
Amounts 
Bound 1 – from Illiquidity 
(A) 
Bound 2 – 
from 
Solvency 
(B) 
Incentive 
Compatibility 
(C) 
Equilibrium of 
Type 2 exists if 
Equilibrium of 
Type 4 exists if 
1. '~ 11 fd t =  
tt kl =~  
Same as in Case I Same as in Case I. Guaranteed Same as in Case I Same as in Case I 
2. '~ 11 fd t =  41 
0~ >tl  ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −
+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−
*
1)(1
)()()1(
r
R
r
wH
R
rr tfd τφφ
 
Same as 
Case I. Guaranteed Af >′1  
Equilibria do not 
exist 
3. '~ 11 fd t =  42 
0~ =tl  
Same as in Case I Same as Case I. 
Only when ( )σσσ ′∈ ~,~  BfA ≤′< 1  and ( )σσσ ′∈ ~,~  1fBA ′<<  
4. 0~1 >td  
tt kl =~  It does not obtain 
It does 
not 
obtain 
It does not obtain It does not obtain It does not obtain 
5. 0~1 >td  43 
0~ =tl  
Same as in Case I Same as in Case I 
Binds when rr =*1 . 
σσ ˆ*1 ≥∀⇒≠∀ rr  
BfAf ≥>′ 01 & , 
and either rr =*1  or 
σσ ˆ*1 ≥∀⇒≠∀ rr  
BfAf <>′ 01 &  
                                                 
41 In Case II, the denominator is positive. However, the value of 
′
1f  associated to the illiquidity condition is negative. Thus, since the domestic country is always a net 
debtor with the rest of the world, the restriction 0'1 ≥f  never binds. 
42 The values σ~ and '~σ that support this equilibrium are the solution to the quadratic equation given by 02 =+⋅+⋅ cba σσ . In this equation, ⎥⎦
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. In particular, when σσ ˆ= , the Incentive Compatibility conditions holds with equality, and it binds. 
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Case II. ),1( *2
*
1
*
0 Rrrr =<>  under Floating Exchange Rates: Table 3.8 presents our 
results when Case II obtains. In this case, not all allocations are incentive compatible and, 
thus, we could observe some circumstances where equilibria of Type 3 do exist. In 
particular, in sub-sets 3 and 5, incentive compatibility can be violated for particular 
values of the monetary policy σ , and we could find that equilibria of Type 3 obtain. 
However, this is not possible in sub-sets 1 and 2. Moreover, notice that the sub-set 4 
does not obtain under this particular configuration of foreign interest rates, and these 
equilibria cease to exist. 
With respect to monetary policy, if the parameter σ is located outside of a 
particular range (for example, in sub-set 3 or if σ is extremely small in Sub-set 5,) the 
incentive compatibility condition is violated. Our method of examining equilibrium 
outcomes attempts to emphasize the potentially important role of monetary policy in an 
environment like the one presented in this paper. Specially, monetary policy is 
instrumental in determining whether the financial system has a potential for fragility, or 
in precluding some equilibrium outcomes that could be highly desirable from a welfare 
standpoint. For example, under circumstances where the monetary authority targets 
inflation rates that are sufficiently low, the drawback could be that the economy is more 
likely be in a situation where financial panics are present in equilibrium after the sudden 
stop of foreign credit. 
  
Table 3.9  Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of Equilibria of Type 2 under Floating Exchange Rates 
Case II. 1*0 >r , Rrr =< *2*1 , with 0== fd φφ  (No Reserve Requirements) 
Sub-Set Re-Optimized 
Amounts 
Incentive Compatibility Equilibria of Type 2 Equilibria of Type 4 
1. '~ 11 fd t =  , tt kl =~  Not applicable Cease to exist Old Type 2 become of Type 4 
2. '~ 11 fd t = , 0~ >tl  Not applicable Cease to exist Old Type 2 become of Type 4 
3. 44 '~ 11 fd t = , 0~ =tl  Not applicable Cease to exist Old Type 2 become of Type 4 
4. 0~1 >td , tt kl =~  It does not obtain It does not obtain It does not obtain 
5. 0~1 >td , 0
~ =tl  Binds when rr =*1 . 
1*1 −≥∀⇒≠∀ σrr  
They do exist They do exist 
                                                 
44 In this sub-set, the Incentive Compatibility constraint is satisfied only when 1−=σ . However, this violates the restrictions that we imposed on the parameter space, 
in order to obtain meaningful economic allocations. In particular, 1−>σ  and 1* −>σ  applies. 98 
  
Table 3.10  Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of Equilibria of Type 1 and Type 4 under Floating Exchange Rates45  
Case I. 1*0 <r , Rrr => *2*1   
Sub 
Set 
Re-Optimized
Amounts 
Condition for Liquidity 
⇒ Condition For Solvency (A) 
Incentive  
Compatibility 
Equilibrium 
of Type 1 
exists if 
Equilibrium 
of Type 4 
exists if 
Equilibrium of 
Type 2 or Type 3  
exist if 
1. 
0~1 =td , 
tt kl =~  
tk
rf ⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⋅−− *
0
0 )1( λ  Guaranteed Af ≤′1  Af >′1  They do not obtain. 
2. 
0~1 =td , 
0~ >tl  ( ) *1*011
)()1(
r
R
rr
wrH
R
r
tfd
⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
+⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−⋅−⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
λ
λ
τφφ  
Guaranteed Af ≥′1  Af >′1  They do not obtain. 
 
                                                 
45The sub-sets present in this table are non trivial, and we observe that 01 =td , '12 fd t =  and '100 ffd t −= . Since the domestic country is a net borrower 
to the rest of the world, the conditions 0≥itd  and 0'10 ≥− ff  must hold. Also, equilibria do not exist under some particular circumstances, and we do 
not present these sub-sets in this table. For example of the case where 01 =td  and 0=tl . The condition 01 <tc  obtains, which violates the basic 
economic criteria, and equilibria therefore do not exist. 
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3.4.2.4  Equilibria of Type 1 versus Equilibria of Type 4 
In Table 3.10, we present the sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria of Type 
1, with liquid and solvent banks. When Case I obtains, we find two non-trivial sub-sets 
of possible equilibria, both with 0~1 =td . In such circumstances, a liquid position implies 
a position that is solvent as well. Then, either equilibria are of Type 1 (with liquid and 
solvent banks, and very high social welfare), or they are of Type 4 (with illiquid and 
insolvent banks, panics and with the lowest social welfare.) There are not intermediate 
situations, though, and we cannot obtain equilibria of Type 2 or of Type 3. This implies 
a very fragile and highly volatile environment in the financial system that could very 
easily lead to panics and generalized bankruptcy. 
 
3.4.2.5  Interaction of the Monetary Policy and Reserve Requirements 
Our model provides a suitable framework for analyzing the interaction among various 
types of monetary policies: controlling the domestic rate of money growth, inflation 
targeting, fixed versus floating exchange rate regimes and regulations of multiple reserve 
requirements. Is it possible to place the banking system into a more vulnerable situation 
by removing the reserve requirements? 
We perform the following exercise for situations where Case II obtains: does the 
scope for existence and determinacy change when the reserve requirements are not in 
place? We present these results in Table 3.9. In particular, notice that equilibria of Type 
2 cease to exist in sub-sets 1, 2 and 3 when 0== fd φφ , thus increasing the scope for 
observing equilibria with financial panics. 
 
3. 5  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we investigate whether a particular monetary policy can help prevent 
financial crises that originate in illiquid positions by banks. We then compare the 
advantages and disadvantages of alternative de facto exchange rate regimes in achieving 
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economy stability. Finally, we evaluate the impact that a policy of multiple reserve 
requirements can have on the scope for existence of equilibria that are not vulnerable to 
crises. 
In order to call attention to the questions that we are interested in, we build a 
dynamic general equilibrium model of a small, open economy that displays nontrivial 
demands for fiat currencies, unexpected sunspots, and financial/banking crises originated 
by sudden stops of foreign capital inflows. We motivate the effective demands for 
domestic and foreign fiat money with a policy of holding reserves of different national 
currencies. These reserves prevent banks from financing domestic investment, but they 
may also provide banks with access to liquid resources in their time of need. Under some 
particular circumstances, reserve requirements may reduce the likelihood of observing 
equilibria with illiquid and insolvent banks. 
In situations where no crises are present, we observe that the monetary rule in 
place determines up to an important extent the existence and properties of equilibria. 
Typically, there is a continuum of stationary equilibria, and local uniqueness and 
determinacy are lacking. On the other hand, a fixed exchange rate regime seems to 
increase the potential for endogenously arising volatility in the economy in general, and 
in the financial system, in particular. 
Next, we examine the case of a sudden stop in a small, open economy that is a 
net borrower from the rest of the world. Not surprisingly, we find that the magnitude of 
the reduction in foreign credit determines the existence of equilibria. However, more 
importantly, we find that it may also affect the scope for fragility and volatility of the 
banking system. Finally, we show the existence of multiple equilibria that we may rank 
based on the presence of binding information constraints and on social welfare. 
The next step in the agenda is to incorporate explicitly nontrivial capital 
accumulation. We can then examine in more detail meaningful potential differences in 
the length and magnitude of recovery under different exchange rate arrangements.  
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Crises are costly. Approximate $200 billion in debt on the bill of taxpayers is the price of 
the Savings & Loan crisis in the US around 1980. Literature studying the S&L crisis in 
the U.S. in 1980s pointed to the same central problem, the moral hazard in deposit 
insurance. Although financial liberalization and released regulations might encourage 
banks to engage in risky banking practices, the protection of the deposit insurance 
worsens banks excessive risk taking behavior. Therefore, the sequential reform acts of 
deposit insurance has been undertaking throughout the years. The starting point of the 
study in chapter II of my dissertation is the reform of the deposit insurance policy in 
2005. I am particularly interested in one issue --- the coverage limit for certain 
retirement accounts will be increased from $100,000 to $250,000. Raising the coverage 
limit, on the one hand, increases consumer’s protection; on the other hand, however, it 
may create disincentives for depositors to monitor the banks’ risk taking behavior. 
Another interesting phenomenon I observed is the difference of coverage limit and how 
to price the deposit insurance among different countries. Raising coverage limit in the 
U.S. and the evidences of the different coverage limit across countries emphasize an 
important issue to think about, the optimal coverage limit. This paper is useful for 
studying several fundamental questions motivated by deposit insurance. How does the 
FDIC price the deposit insurance in an environment in which the moral hazard problem 
arise naturally? Does the optimal coverage limit working together with the proper risk 
premium successfully combat banks excessive risk taking? Does the market discipline 
work better to manage the moral hazard problem than prudent banking regulations such 
as capital requirements and the risk premium? If so, what should the government do to 
ensure the market discipline?  
While some research have discussed parts of the moral hazard problem addressed 
here, the main contribution of this paper is to tackle the joint determination of optimal 
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coverage limit and optimal risk premium within a partial equilibrium model with 
heterogeneous depositors, depositor’s monitoring, and bank’s moral hazard problem. In 
the model, the deposit insurance with limited coverage is essential to the effort of 
managing the moral hazard problem. Because of the partial coverage, opposed to the full 
coverage, the depositors have an incentive to do part of the monitoring of the bank’s 
risk-taking behavior. Depositors might threaten the banks with early withdrawal of 
deposits if necessary. The model includes three types of players; Banks display risk-
taking behavior, depositors are ex-ante heterogeneous, and the benevolent insurance 
company provides deposit insurance. I find that partial deposit insurance combined with 
risk sensitive premium in the presence of capital requirements can improve social 
welfare. Moreover, when the partial coverage limit is in place, banks could be better off 
by finding a balance between the higher premia and the depositor’s monitor and 
withdrawals. The coverage limit derived from the welfare maximization problem in this 
model provides us with an alternative to the option pricing method in obtaining the 
appropriate coverage limit and risk premium. 
Beside the S&L crisis happened in the U.S., the occurrence of currency crises all 
over the world -Mexico in 1994, Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1998, Turkey in 
1999 and Argentina in 2001, has caught the attention of the public and of the profession. 
A currency crisis is an abrupt and significant reduction in the value of a currency. When 
this occurs, the domestic fiat currency loses its ability to perform its basic functions as a 
medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value. Therefore, the central issue I 
address in my dissertation moves from the optimal mechanism design of deposit 
insurance in chapter II to the international illiquidity in a small open economy in chapter 
III. The overexpansion of the private sector, especially the domestic banking system, has 
been concluded as one of the most important element in the Asian crises in 1997. The 
potential association between the fragility of the financial system, currency crises, and 
exchange rate regimes/monetary policy has received relatively little attention in the 
previous literature. Thus, in chapter III I put the effort especially on the aforementioned 
linkage, which is of the utmost importance for most open economies. My general 
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intention is to identify more precisely why these Asian countries were suffered the 
contagious crises and how each country’s specific feature, the performance of alternative 
exchange rate arrangements and associated monetary policies, influenced the fragility of 
the economy in the aftermath of the crises. With this in mind, I build a Dynamic General 
Equilibrium Model -with micro-foundations- replicating a small, open economy with a 
nontrivial banking system. 
To fix ideas, I model a small, open economy that reproduces several aspects of 
the East-Asian countries at the time of the crisis. The private sector is a net debtor of the 
rest of the world, and there is an exogenous upper limit to foreign credit at each point in 
time. Ex-ante identical domestic agents face an uncertainty whose realization is private 
information. There is a standard problem in coordination that may lead to crises of a 
self-fulfilling type. This set up allows us to study the effects of sudden stops and bank 
runs, and how do they relate to each other. Domestic and foreign fiat currencies may 
circulate in the economy, and domestic investment is subject to multiple, unremunerated 
reserve requirements that take the form of currency reserves. Then, I model two 
economies that are similar in every respect, except for their choice of exchange rate 
regimes. The first economy has floating exchange rates, and I intend to replicate the 
main characteristics share by Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand after the crisis. 
I evaluate the performance of two alternative monetary policies that will lead to different 
de facto exchange rate regimes: a constant rate of money growth versus a policy of 
inflation targeting. In the second economy, a fixed exchange rate regime is in place, and 
I intend to replicate the main characteristics of Malaysia after the crisis. 
The results show the existence of multiple equilibria that can be ranked base on 
the presence of binding information constraints and on welfare. I also can show that 
there is a strong association between the scope for existence and for indeterminacy of 
equilibria and the underlying policy regime. What kind of equilibrium the society will 
achieve at the end of the day depends not only on the bank’s financial situation but also 
relies heavily on depositors’ behavior. Whether the bank is illiquid at the end of the first 
period and/or insolvent at the beginning of the second period can help us narrow the 
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possible equilibria. However, the panic equilibrium will occur depends on one crucial 
condition, the incentive compatibility condition. If the patient agent panic and behavior 
just like impatient depositors and withdraw immediately, the run equilibrium will 
happen.  In addition, in this paper, policies do matter. I find that the presence of binding 
multiple reserve requirements may help in reducing the scope for financial fragility and 
panic equilibria.  
These two essays, chapters II and III in my dissertation, could be extended in 
many possible directions. Other than the detailed discussions at the end of each chapter, 
one issue deserves special emphasis. The financial markets are contagious and sensitive 
to various reasons that might trigger crises and bank runs. The current sub-prime 
mortgage crisis, for example, is mixing with many ingredients at the same time. How to 
model this crisis and further provide some helpful policy suggestion is the next topic I 
want to study. While to identify a starting point of a crisis might be straightforward, it is 
difficult to clarify or even model the widespread effects on financial markets. The first 
sign of the crises is related to the moral hazard problem from the excessive risk-taking 
behavior. Rooted in the housing market, competition among financial institutions and 
mortgage companies undoubtedly encouraged the risky behavior of making loans to the 
sub-prime mortgage borrowers. The subsequent slowdown of the housing price boom 
and the burst of the housing bubble narrowed the chance for borrowers to refinance their 
mortgages. Hence, default rates and the number of home foreclosures skyrocketed. The 
condition of the economy started to turn from bad to worse due to the liquidity concerns 
and increased risk aversion among banks. The higher interest rates on loans could serve 
as an accurate indicator. In addition, the widespread credit crunch and the fear of the 
banking crises might drive up the self-fulfilling panic withdrawals. The contagious 
effects among different markets might further generate externality which will affect 
agents’ decisions.46 
                                                 
46 Kaminsky and Reinhart’s (1999) finding is consistent with the current situation in the U.S.; an underway 
banking crisis may predict a future currency crisis. The high interest rates work to defend either the 
exchange rate or the fear of the inflation will aggravate the unstable markets. The current US mortgage 
crisis is just an example of how serious and contagious a crisis could be. 
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APPENDIX A 
TECHNICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER II 
 
1.  Premium with Capital Requirements 
Under the full covered deposit insurance, the survival probability of a bank can be 
derived directly from this bank’s portfolio without considering any possible move of 
depositors. If the bank’s return from the combination of the gamble-prudent investment 
is greater than the cost the bank needs to repay, the bank survives47. Bank’s survival 
probability is  
Pr(Ri+α [(1-P)(D1+D2)-i]-r (D1+D2)>0) = Pr(R>Rf), 
where Rf ≡ α-(1/i)[α(1-P)-r](D1+D2). To put it another way, if the random realized return 
R is greater than the survival threshold Rf, the bank survives; otherwise, the bank fails. 
Under this environment, each bank faces the same flat rate premium, which is charged at 
the beginning of the period, no matter how much risk the bank takes. Bank’s expected 
return is  
dRRfDDriDDPRi
fR
)(})(]))(1[({ 2121∫∞ +−−+−+α  
, and the optimal gambling asset is 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
α
α
−
−+⋅−−=
f
f R
DqqDrP
i 21
11  
                                                 
47 For simplicity, we do not consider the Diamond-Dybvig type’s self-fulfilling bank run; instead, the bank 
may be closed only because it is insolvent when gambling failed. 
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APPENDIX B 
TECHNICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER III 
 
1.  Comparing Alternative Transfers-Schemes 
In this section, we consider the case where the government gives transfers to young 
agents claiming to be of the impatient type after individuals learn their types. Notice that 
it is not possible to verify types directly, since they are private information. 
 
1.1  The Model 
In the situation where the government gives the transfers to young agents claiming to be 
of the impatient type after agents learn their types, we can write the conditions for a 
general equilibrium as 
 wddk dfttt )1(20 φφ −−++≤  (B.1.1) 
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1.2  Existence of Steady-State Equilibria under Floating Exchange Rates 
When the monetary authority gives the transfers to young agents claiming to be of the 
impatient type, we observe the following: 
 wzz dtt φ==+1  (B.1.7) 
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We present these results in Table B.1 below. 
 
 
 
Table B.1  Existence of Steady- State Equilibria with Transfers to Young  
Impatient Agents, 0=tl . A Floating Exchange Rate Regime 
  Case I Case II 
Type of 
Equilibria 
Amount 
Borrowed 1
*
0 <r  and Rrr => *2*1  1*0 >r  and Rrr =< *2*1  
No intra-
period 
foreign debt 
 
02 fd =  
00 =d  
011 ffd −=  
We can observe one of two 
cases: 
1.  Equilibria do not exist, or 
2. Equilibria exist only for 
values of σ  sufficiently 
low. 
We can observe one of two cases: 
1. Equilibria exist for all relevant 
parameter values, or 
2. Equilibria exist only for values 
of σ  sufficiently high. 
Interior 
solution 
02 >d  
200 dfd −=  
211 dfd −=  
Equilibria exist only when σ  
is neither too low nor too high 
Equilibria exist only when σ  is 
neither too low nor too high 
No long-
term foreign 
debt 
02 =d  
00 fd =  
11 fd =  
We can observe one of three 
cases: 
1. Equilibria do not exist, or 
2. Equilibria exist only for 
values of σ  that are neither 
too low nor too high, or 
3. Equilibria exist only for 
values of σ  sufficiently 
low. 
We can observe one of three 
cases: 
1. Equilibria do not exist, or 
2. Equilibria exist only for 
values of σ  that are neither 
too low nor too high, or 
3. Equilibria exist only for 
values of σ  sufficiently high. 
 
  
112
1.3  Existence of Steady-State Equilibria under Fixed Exchange Rates 
Table B.2 on the next page, presents the results for situations where the monetary 
authority gives transfers to young agents claiming to be of the impatient type. 
 
 
 
Table B.2  Existence of Steady-State Equilibria with Transfers to Young  
Impatient Agents. A Fixed Exchange Rate Regime 
  Case I Case II 
Type of 
Equilibria 
Amount 
Borrowed 
1*0 <r  and Rrr => *2*1  1*0 >r  and Rrr =< *2*1  
No intra-
period 
foreign 
debt 
 
02 fd =  
00 =d  
011 ffd −=  
We can observe one of three 
cases: 
1. Equilibria do not exist, or, 
2. Equilibria exist for values of 
*σ  that are neither too low 
nor too high, or. 
3. Equilibria exist only for 
values of *σ  sufficiently low. 
We can observe one of three cases: 
1. Equilibria do not exist, or, 
2. Equilibria exist for values of *σ  
that are neither too low nor too 
high, or. 
3. Equilibria exist only for values 
of *σ  sufficiently high. 
Interior 
solution 
02 >d  
200 dfd −=  
211 dfd −=  
Equilibria exist for values of *σ  
that are neither too low nor too 
high. 
Equilibria exist for values of *σ  
that are neither too low nor too high. 
No long-
term 
foreign 
debt 
02 =d  
00 fd =  
11 fd =  
We can observe one of three 
cases: 
1. Equilibria do not exist, or, 
2. Equilibria exist for values of 
*σ  that are neither too low 
nor too high, or 
3. Equilibria exist only for 
values of *σ  sufficiently low. 
We can observe one of three cases: 
1. Equilibria do not exist, or, 
2. Equilibria exist for values of *σ  
that are neither too low nor too 
high, or 
3. Equilibria exist only for values 
of *σ  sufficiently high. 
 
  
113
2. Bifurcations under a Floating Exchange Rate Regime 
A.  Case I. 1*0 <r  and Rrr => *2*1  
In this section we illustrate the presence of bifurcation values for the monetary policy 
parameter σ , under floating exchange rates. It is straightforward to replicate and extend 
such analysis for the case of fixed exchange rates. To fix ideas, we focus on the case 
where equilibria do not have long-term foreign debt and Case I obtains (i.e. 1*0 <r  and 
Rrr => *2*1 ). 
To get matters started, it will be helpful to define the following functions: 
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Notice that the limits of these functions as σ  approaches 0 from the right or infinity 
from the left are well defined and bounded. 
The existence and properties of equilibria may vary when the value of the 
monetary policy parameter σ  changes. In particular, the properties of the main factors 
defined in equations (B.2.1)-(B.2.4) will change as σ  changes, and so will the existence 
and/or properties of the stationary equilibria. Of course, we restrict our attention to 
allocations where 1−>σ  holds. 
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a)  Case I with )()()( σσσ BAC <<  
There are three possible situations: curve )(σC  and )(σA  intersect twice, they intersect 
once or they do not intersect at all. Also, from the first order condition of the constrained 
maximization problem48, we know that an equilibrium exists when ( ) ( )σσ ArC << *1  
and )(σCR < . In this case, the existence of equilibria requires values of σ  that are high 
enough. We illustrate these results below, in Figure B.1 panel (a) to (e). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.1  Bifurcation Values for the Parameter σ . 
Case I and )()()( σσσ BAC <<  
                                                 
48 We can summarize the extra restrictions that the First Order Conditions impose on *1r  as follows: 
equilibria do exist only when the conditions ( )σAr >*1 , ( )σBr ≤*1 , and ( )σCr >*1  are satisfied. 
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b)  Case I with )()()( σσσ ABC <<  
The following conditions obtain in equilibria with no long-term foreign debt: 
 0lim
0
<∂
∂<∞− +→ σσ
B  (B.2.5) 
 0lim
0
<∂
∂<∞− +→ σσ
C  (B.2.6) 
 0lim =∂
∂
−∞→ σσ
B  (B.2.7) 
and 
 0lim =∂
∂
−∞→ σσ
C  (B.2.8) 
However, we cannot determine, a priori, which of these limits has a larger magnitude, as 
σ  approaches zero or infinity. In Figure B.2 panel (a), we illustrate the fact that when 
the condition ( ) ( ) 1, −>∀> σσσ CB  obtains, equilibria exist only for values of σ  that 
are high enough. In Figure B.2 panel (b), instead, we observe that equilibria do not exist 
when ( ) ( ) 1, −>∀> σσσ BC  holds, since it violates the extra constraint derived from the 
First Order Conditions. 
 
 
Figure B.2  Bifurcation Values for the Parameter σ . Case I and )()()( σσσ ABC <<  
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3.  Multiplicity and Indeterminacy of Stationary Equilibria 
--Floating Exchange Rates 
We use the case of equilibria with no intra-period debt to illustrate the uniqueness and 
determinacy properties of equilibria, together with the role played by the policy 
parameter σ . It is straightforward to extend the analysis to other types of equilibria or to 
the case of fixed exchange rates. Typically, we observe a continuum of stationary 
equilibria that, of course, are not locally unique or determinate. 
A.  Case I. 1*0 <r  and Rrr => *2*1 . 
The thick gray lines in Figure B.3 display the combinations of foreign interest rates that 
are consistent with the existence of equilibria. The condition )(')(')(' σσσ BAC <<  obtains 
in Figure B.3 panel (a), while )(')(')(' σσσ BCA <<  holds in Figure B.3 panel (b). In each 
case, there is a continuum of equilibria. Thus, equilibria are not locally unique or 
determinate. 
 
 
 
   
Figure B.3  Multiplicity and Indeterminacy of Stationary Equilibria.  
Case I. 1*0 <r  and Rrr => *2*1  
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B.  Case II. 1*0 >r  and Rrr =< *2*1  
The gray curves in Figure B.4 constitute the combinations of interest rates for which all 
equilibrium conditions hold. The condition )(')(')(' σσσ BAC <<  holds for the case 
illustrated in Figure B.4 panel (a), but )(')(')(' σσσ BCA <<  is satisfied in panel (b). 
 
 
Figure B.4  Multiplicity and Indeterminacy of Stationary Equilibria. 
Case II. 1*0 >r  and Rrr =< *2*1  
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